

MARINE JETS JOIN VIETNAM BUILD-UP

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the squadron. "I'll tell you, we have been waiting a long time for this," said the Marine commander, Brig. Gen. Frederick J. Karch, as he welcomed the pilots on the Danang flightline. "This is really great!"

Col. Donald Stapp of Fort Meade, Fla., and Ventura, Calif., called the Phantoms "the hottest aircraft in Vietnam right now." The Navy is also using them from carriers.

Colonel Stapp, who arrived a week ago as General Karch's chief of staff, said each Phantom could carry eight tons of bombs and ammunition.

Asked about reports that still another squadron would be assigned to support the brigade, he replied:

"It will depend on the tempo of operations. We would expect to have more aircraft than we have now, considering the number of ground troops we have here now."

Primary Mission

"They will have the primary mission of supporting the brigade's ground troops," General Karch said of the Marine jets.

Asked whether they might take part in strikes on North Vietnam, he said: "It is within their capability. I would imagine their role will expand considerably."

The Marine commander declined to be drawn into a discussing whether his ground troops would take a more aggressive role in fighting the Vietcong in South Vietnam. They are presently confined to guarding the Danang base.

"I am sure there is consideration being given every day as to what better use we can make of our resources here," he said, "but that is a matter that will have to be decided at a high Government level."

Asked if he would like to see the Marines take a more aggressive role, he replied: "Did you ever see a Marine that didn't like an aggressive role?"

Authoritative sources in Saigon said it was likely that the Marines would add more aggressive patrolling to their normal defense of the base, on the theory that "offense is the best defense."

The sources said it was also probable that the Marines would eventually undertake helicopter infantry attacks on any Vietcong concentrations around their area of responsibility.

Pentagon Has No Comment

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, April 10—

The Pentagon said today that it would not comment on a re-

port from Saigon that marines in the Danang area might undertake more aggressive patrolling in the area of their responsibility.

Military sources said privately that operations of this kind usually depended on the local commander's assessment of the given situation. It is known, however, that except when under actual attack, United States forces in Vietnam seek Washington's approval for military operations.

Taylor Discusses Build-Up

By JACK LANGGUTH

Special to The New York Times

SAIGON, South Vietnam, April 24—Ambassador Maxwell D. Taylor is conferring with the Saigon Government about an American plan to bring as many as 5,000 more United States servicemen to South Vietnam within the next 60 days.

Such an increase would bring to 35,000 the United States military contingent here.

Mr. Taylor met today with the Premier, Dr. Phan Huy Quat.

Informed sources said the Ambassador was proceeding cautiously with the proposal because Dr. Quat had shown himself sensitive to Vietnamese and foreign opinion about the growing American presence in his country and because, while an increase was approved at the recent Honolulu conference of defense leaders, it is still subject to review by President Johnson.

The troops would probably be stationed at Bienhoa, one of the three largest jet air bases in South Vietnam.

American military commanders are known to believe that the defenses at Bienhoa, 20 miles north of Saigon, are perilously thin.

They have also expressed concern about the exposed position of Quinhon, the capital of Binh-dinh Province, in Central Vietnam.

A decision on the type of troops to be sent here is expected to raise difficulty. The United States Government, it is known, would prefer to dispatch combat infantry soldiers for patrol duties. But from Dr. Quat's past attitude, planners have inferred that he would prefer to receive a special unit, such as air-borne troops or more United States marines.

The landing of a large number of infantrymen would raise unpleasant recollections of the French colonial war, Dr. Quat is known to feel. But his opposition is not believed to rule out further consideration of the matter.

His Government's sensitivity is indicated by its dismay at the designation "Ninth Expeditionary Brigade" for the marines who landed last month at Da-nang.

In all Vietnamese communiqués, the word "expeditionary" was omitted because of its prior use by the French Army.

In a raid against North Vietnam this morning, United States Air Force planes destroyed the Komthaixa highway bridge on Route 111, west of Vinh, about 135 miles south of Hanoi.

Thirty-five F-105 fighter-bombers, supported by 25 other

jets, also hit a ferry area on the Vinhson highway, where Route 7 crosses the Co River, near Vinh. About 100 tons of 750-pound bombs were dropped on the two targets.

In a late-night raid yesterday, six United States B-57 jet bombers destroyed an antiaircraft site and hit a truck convoy during a reconnaissance flight over Routes 7, 8 and 12 in southern areas of North Vietnam.

5 Planes Down, Tass Says

A correspondent for the official Soviet press agency Tass, in a dispatch datelined Vinh, said yesterday that about five planes had been shot down on raids in the area.

"I have never seen such fierce fighting in this area," he wrote. "The sky from where the enemy planes began their attacks was dotted with bursts of exploding shells. Moments passed, and the first pilot was shot down. The town was shuddering from explosions."

HANOI'S GOAL: ONE VIETNAM

By SEYMOUR TOPPING

Special to The New York Times

SAIGON, South Vietnam, April 10 — When President Johnson offered peace this week to Hanoi, he made a stipulation that predictably would be rejected by the Communists. The President insisted on an independent South Vietnam that would be securely guaranteed.

For the Communists in their moments of party conclave, the records show, the designation North or South is a formal or propaganda term only. The leaders in Hanoi look upon the Vietcong insurgency in South Vietnam as their own war. Their attitudes are in the main shared by their subordinates in the South.

According to the planning of the Liberation Front, independence for South Vietnam would be only an intermediate step toward a unified nation under the control of leaders in Hanoi. This is considered the unfinished business of 1954.

In signing the 1954 Geneva accord which ended the French Indochina War and divided Vietnam, the Communists thought they had taken merely a political detour to eventual domination of the whole country. They were disappointed.

Helped by U.S.

The national elections did not take place in July, 1956, as prescribed at Geneva. South Vietnam was bailed out of its enormous economic and political difficulties by President Ngo Dinh Diem with American aid. The country did not fall into the lap of Hanoi as the Communists had expected.

Realizing that the Geneva tactics had failed, Hanoi sent its agents back across the 17th Parallel to activate cell organizations in South Vietnam that had remained under cover. By 1959 the Vietcong insurgency had taken form.

According to much the same

pattern, experts on Vietnamese Communism believe that any formal agreement entered into by Hanoi in response to President Johnson's bid would be a tactical maneuver. In 1954, under Soviet prodding, the Vietnamese Communists gambled on a political device that averted the danger of general war in Asia. In 1965, under pressure of the United States air bombing, North Vietnam might enter into another agreement, but the Communists openly say that they will not again make the mistakes of 1954 that lost them the South.

Basis of Effort

The Communist drive for the unification of Vietnam has both economic and ideological roots. Economically North Vietnam is not viable. It is a food-deficit area where the population expansion exceeds the increase in agricultural output. The country has managed to survive on a subsistence level because of more than a billion dollars in aid given by the Communist bloc, principally Moscow and Peking. To become viable, Hanoi needs the rice and other resources of South Vietnam.

The alternative for Hanoi would be continued dependence on the largesse of the Soviet Union and Communist China. Increasingly national in outlook since the aggravation of the Chinese-Soviet ideological dispute, the Vietnamese Communists seem to have no more stomach for extending their reliance on Moscow and Peking than they would have for dependence on the United States under the economic program outlined by President Johnson this week.

In South Vietnam, apart from the Communists and their immediate allies, there is little evident enthusiasm

for national unification on Hanoi's terms. Most educated Vietnamese in the South approve of the general concept of eventual unity, but there is also strong attachment to regionalism. The South Vietnamese generally seem shy of exchanging their relatively prosperous existence for the threadbare, regimented life which the Communists have imposed on the North.

Government Supported

In the South Vietnamese countryside, the Vietcong are not as welcome as their pre-1954 predecessors, the Vietminh, who led a fairly popular anticolonial war against the French.

A measure of this change is the active support often rendered to the Saigon Administration when the Government can guarantee security from Vietcong terrorism. Hanoi responded to this

challenge in the South with tough tactics and the infiltration of highly trained Communist cadres, military leaders and shipments of arms to sustain their effort.

Abroad there has been considerable discussion as to whether the Vietcong insurgency is organized and directed by Hanoi or whether its roots are indigenous to the South. When this question is put to a Vietnamese Communist privately he often displays satisfaction. First, because it confirms what his ideology suggests about the supposed naiveté of many bourgeois intellectuals. Secondly, because the question implies that the frequently utilized Communist propaganda tactic is working.

In South Vietnam today we are told that the Liberation Front membership has only a fraction which is Communist. There is no doubt, however,

that it is a branch of the Lao Dong party, successor of the 1954 Vietminh, and the line of command extends to Hanoi.

The People's Revolutionary party is indigenous to the South in that thousands of its cadre who are leading the Vietcong insurgency are of South Vietnam origin. Most, however, were trained in the North and then infiltrated back into the South.

Northern Trained

The extent of direct North Vietnamese involvement in the Vietcong military operations is becoming more difficult for Hanoi to obscure. The supply of South Vietnamese manpower which went North after 1954 is running out. Communist cadres and soldiers of North Vietnamese origin make up an increasingly large share of regular Vietcong units infiltrating South Vietnam via Laos. This is discernible from

prisoner interrogation and documents found on the bodies of the Vietcong battle dead.

In the central highlands, according to United States intelligence reports, there is evidence that units of a regular North Vietnamese division have infiltrated through Laos in recent months. Throughout South Vietnam, regular Vietcong units are being re-

equipped with a new family of 7.62-millimeter weapons which are Chinese copies of Soviet infantry arms. These are evidently brought in from supply depots in North Vietnam.

According to a United States Government report on infiltration, nearly 20,000 Vietcong officers, soldiers and technicians have entered South

*Vietnam under
Hanoi's supervision*

permeated since 1958. A minimum of 4,400 and possibly as many as 7,400 were sent into South Vietnam during last year, the report said.

Many months are required to establish an infiltration rate during a given period because of the intelligence collecting and evaluation process. On a basis of incomplete correlations, United States officers here believe that the current rate of infiltration from North Vietnam is similar to that of last year.

The extent to which the war in South Vietnam is directed by Hanoi could be determined if in response to United States pressure the North Vietnamese leaders decided to call it all off. Could Hanoi summarily suspend hostilities?

Vietcong Gains Cited

While Hanoi is thought to have general political and military control of the war in the South, analysts here believe that the North Vietnamese leadership would have to take into account the wishes of Vietcong field commanders. The Vietcong have fought a long, difficult campaign which has given their guerrillas control of more than half of South Vietnam. Their commanders would not easily surrender their gains. If Hanoi were to enter into any peace agreement, it could insure disciplined response from all Vietcong commanders only if an avenue was kept open for their eventual assumption of power in South Vietnam. The price that President Johnson asks for, a peace in which independent South Vietnam is securely guaranteed, is therefore hardly one that Hanoi is likely to be willing to pay.

Air Attacks in South Vietnam Hurting Morale of Vietcong

By SEYMOUR TOPPING

Special to The New York Times

SAIGON, South Vietnam, April 14 — Interrogation of Vietcong defectors and prisoners has indicated that intensified air attacks have lowered morale in Communist-held areas of South Vietnam.

United States and South Vietnamese air commanders still are having difficulty locating targets except where the Vietcong commit large units in standing battle. However, the fighter bombers are employing new techniques that have psychological as well as destructive effect.

Vietcong prisoners report that the presence of aircraft tends to inhibit movement of Communist units. This is a result not only of bombing and strafing but also of strikes by rocket-firing helicopters transporting airborne troops.

Talks with officials on the Mekong River delta suggest that some of the increased number of peasants who are leaving Vietcong areas and entering Government relocation centers are doing so in an attempt to avoid air harassment.

Other peasants going to relocation centers for resettlement say they are escaping higher Vietcong taxation and terrorism.

Identity Ignored

An independent study shows that in Vietcong areas the population generally looks upon all attack aircraft as American. The ordinary peasant does not take into account that some of the aircraft are South Vietnamese, although in fact many of the fighters bear the markings of the South Vietnamese Air Force and are piloted by Vietnamese.

One of the conclusions of the study was that the recent increase in air operations, including the use of United States jets, was not likely to engender much more hostility toward Americans. This is based on the assumption that the air attacks have already been exploited to the maximum by the Vietcong for propaganda purposes.

United States and South Vietnamese air commanders seem to take all possible precautions to insure the protection of civilian populations.

The responsibility for calling in air strikes often rests with forward air controllers who know the country well and who

mark target areas with flares or rockets.

Official statistics on the air strikes against the Vietcong show more than 1,000 persons killed monthly since last November. Prior to that the figure was 200 to 300 monthly.

United States officials say the dead are all adult males. Independent observers believe there are some civilians among the dead.

In the flat delta country, where cover is often limited to trees and shrubbery along the canals and tributaries, the Vietcong units are more exposed to air attacks than in the less populated mountains and wooded areas of the central highlands.

One United States adviser with a Vietnamese ranger battalion that had been hard hit by the Vietcong northwest of Kontum said that the elephant grass and jungle canopy above was so thick that it blocked the smoke from his signal grenades when he tried to call in air support.

Spray of Projectiles

A new technique employed by United States aircraft is the use of the "lazy dog" canister. Exploded at an altitude of several thousand feet, the canisters release a spray of finned projectiles that fall like rain. A projectile can hit a man with the impact of a .45-caliber slug and can penetrate vehicles and lightly built structures.

Another technique is "seeding." Hundreds of delayed-action bombs are dropped on what is believed to be a Vietcong encampment area. The bombs explode from two hours to two days later. Seeding has been carried out extensively recently in the central highlands near the Laotian border, where units of the regular 325th North Vietnamese Division may have infiltrated.

HANOI TROOP UNIT FIGHTING IN SOUTH

Saigon Confirms Presence
of Battalion 300 Miles
Northeast of Capital

By United Press International

SAIGON, South Vietnam, Monday, April 26—American and South Vietnamese spokesmen confirmed for the first time today that a regular unit of the North Vietnamese Army was fighting in South Vietnam.

The unit was identified as the Second Battalion of the 101st Regiment of the 325th Division.

"We have enough evidence of the battalion's presence to pass it from the 'probable' to the 'confirmed' category," a spokesman for the United States Embassy said.

American officials in the past have conceded the presence of North Vietnamese regulars, but have always maintained they were distributed among Vietcong units rather than fighting as separate units.

The South Vietnamese Government said that the Communist battalion was serving in Kontum Province, about 300 miles northeast of Saigon. It said that a North Vietnamese soldier surrendered to Government forces on March 23.

In fighting yesterday, United States Marine reinforcements and artillery drove off Communist guerrillas attacking an airbase outpost near Danang after seven outnumbered marines held off the first Vietcong con-

ventional attack against American combat troops.

Two marines and at least two guerrillas were killed in the bitter fighting, and four Americans were wounded.

In the air, United States and Vietnamese planes raided North Vietnam four times during the day, knocking out antiaircraft emplacements and damaging two bridges.

The Communists made their attack on the marines in pre-dawn darkness near Phubal Air Base, north of Danang. The marines held them off until reinforcements and artillery came to their aid. Then the Communists were driven off, leaving at least two dead and evidence that two more were killed.

Some United States and South Vietnamese military leaders believe that the Vietcong are planning a major attack on the Danang complex, possibly to coincide with the anniversary of the 1954 French defeat at Dien-bienphu May 7.

U.S. OFFICER SEES G.I. COMBAT ROLE IN VIETNAM SOON

High Aid in Saigon Predicts
Limits on Use of Troops
Will End in Summer

SEOUL EXPECTED TO ACT

Korea Reported Preparing
to Send an Army Division
by the End of August

By JACK LANGGUTH

Special to The New York Times

SAIGON, South Vietnam, June 4—A senior American officer, reviewing setbacks suffered in the last week by South Vietnamese Government forces, predicted today that United States combat troops would enter the Vietnamese war this summer.

Cataloguing the means available to halt the Communist offensive, the spokesman cited jet bombing strikes, helicopter lifts of South Vietnamese troops and the presence of United States forces in South Vietnam.

"The time will come when they will play their role," he added.

It was the most explicit public statement on plans for the use of American troops, which United States commanders have confirmed privately. Thus far, American forces in South Vietnam have been classed as defensive and advisory.

Commanders Preparing

Recent weeks have brought increasingly frequent reports that United States commanders were preparing their troops for full participation in the war.

[Two United States marines were killed and 27 wounded Friday in two engagements with the Vietcong near the Danang Air Base, according to press association dispatches from Vietnam.

[In Seoul a high Defense Ministry official said that despite official denials, preparations were under way to send a 15,000-man combat division to Vietnam by the end of August. Page 6.]

A United States mission spokesman also confirmed reports from Washington that North Vietnam had received at least six Ilyushin-28 light jet bombers from the Soviet Union.

The three-man jets, which have a range of 1,500 miles and a speed of 400 knots, were unveiled at a Soviet air show May 1, 1950.

The spokesman said that the bombers had not yet been used in Vietnam. He declined to speculate on their military significance to the North.

United States intelligence sources said the bombers had been judged to have only psy-

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chological significance for the North Vietnamese.

While alerts against their use have been instituted, the sources said, American officials do not believe that the North Vietnamese will try to use the bombers in the south.

An American officer conducting the United States military mission's monthly news briefing said the United States had uncovered no credible evidence that either Soviet or Chinese advisers were serving with the Vietcong guerrillas.

Asked about reports that regular units of the North Vietnamese Army were fighting in the South, he observed that a captured roster showed that all but two soldiers from a Vietcong battalion engaged at Quangnai last week were from North Vietnam.

"It's becoming academic whether they are fighting as regular units from the North Vietnamese Army," he said. "They're from the North just the same."

In most respects the Quangnai battle was the largest of the war, with three or four Vietcong battalions fighting as a regiment, the officer said.

Final figures from the Quangnai battle which ended on Monday, showed 392 Government soldiers either killed or missing, the Vietcong captured 446 rifles and carbines and 90 larger weapons, including three .30-caliber machine guns, five 60-mm. mortars and two 57-mm. recoilless rifles.

Although Saigon maintains that 560 Communist soldiers were killed in the action, only 20 Vietcong weapons were captured.

In action in North Vietnam, the United States Navy and Air Force continued their daily strikes. One raid hit military headquarters at Banma, about 80 miles southwest of Hanoi.

A United States military spokesman said four F-105 Thunderchief jet fighter-bombers had destroyed the center's main communications building and two others, as well as one of two antennas.

An attack against the Honnieu radar site, an island 135 miles southeast of Hanoi, damaged four buildings at the station, which has been hit before.

Marines Kill 11 Guerrillas

SAIGON, Saturday, June 5 (Reuters) — A United States Marine Corps platoon, trapped by a Vietcong band in a deep stream bed yesterday, killed 11 guerrillas in a sharp fire fight, a spokesman here announced today.

The marines were on a routine patrol near Hue, 400 miles northeast of Saigon, when the Vietcong struck.

The marines counter-attacked, driving the guerrillas into the stream bed. Eight marines were wounded in the action.

2 Marines Die in Earlier Fight

SAIGON, June 4 (UPI) — Two United States marines were killed and 19 were wounded today in a battle that was believed to be the Marines' heaviest fighting since their arrival in Vietnam. Five Marine companies and Marine jets were believed to have killed as many as 79 Communist guerrillas with the help of a Vietcong turncoat.

The fighting occurred around the United States air base at Danang and in the Phubai area, 50 miles to the northwest.

A Marine spokesman said 19 guerrillas had been killed and 11 wounded by 1,000 marines in a series of ground battles. One guerrilla and 43 suspected guerrillas were taken prisoner.

The captured guerrilla then flew with a United States observation plane and pointed out Vietcong targets for the Ma-

rine jets. He noted two company-size positions and the observation pilot marked them with smoke bombs.

The jets made 18 strikes, and the pilots reported 60 Communists killed.

WASHINGTON.

THE everlasting issue of war or peace is no easier for a President to deal with today than it has been throughout most of our history, when electronic computers to supplement the mind were not even in men's dreams. No one knows this better than Lyndon Baines Johnson, who daily is making irreversible military and diplomatic decisions.

Jealous of his niche in history, which for him especially means his place in the affection of his countrymen, Johnson is "making the record"—through speeches, press conferences and letters. Tomorrow's historian will not want for proper "sources."

But how does Johnson come to his decisions? What is the atmosphere in which he pieces together the informa-

tion, the ideas, the inspiration—and, yes, the criticism—that are the stuff of policy-making? No full answers can ever be constructed out of the documents alone because the process of deciding is intangible and evanescent. Yet the questions remain, and they are central in the estimate Americans make of how they are doing in the world, and on which their judgment of Johnson may, in good part, ultimately rest.

In the momentous days in the second week of June when decisions were being taken to enlarge the United States commitment of ground forces in South Vietnam, I had the opportunity to study the process of deciding; if not at first hand, at least close up. What follows is an account of a series of conversations I had with President Johnson; Secretary of State Dean Rusk; Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara; McGeorge Bundy, Special Assistant to the Presi-

dent for National Security Affairs; Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs William P. Bundy, and Special Assistant to the President Bill D. Moyers. The order in which I spoke to these makers of our policies did not seem important. I thought it appropriate, however, that I visit the President last.

MY first talk was with McNamara. In his huge oak-paneled office in the Pentagon, which, incidentally, commands one of the best views of the city of Washington. His previous caller had been Ambassador Maxwell D. Taylor, home from Saigon for high-level discussions, who nodded to me absently on his way out. Taylor's presence there was a dramatic reminder—if any were still needed—of how our military and diplomatic activities have become intertwined in Vietnam and elsewhere. McNamara's greeting was gracious.

He responded pleasantly to my recollection that we had met once before—on the wet afternoon three years ago when Columbia University gave him an honorary degree. He took off his jacket, saying with mock seriousness: "It's gotten so I can't think with my coat on."

My first question, which in various forms I would ask again and again in the next three days, was: "When was the decision made to escalate the war in Vietnam?"

McNamara answered the question head on: The escalation has been going on gradually since 1954. He read to me from President Eisenhower's letter to President Ngo Dinh Diem, dated Oct. 23, 1954, which the Secretary "happened to have" on his desk, and which he gave me a photocopy of before I left. The sentence he particularly called to my attention was the one in which Eisenhower offered "to assist the Government of Vietnam in

developing and maintaining a strong, viable state, capable of resisting attempted subversion or aggression through military means."

The Secretary emphasized that United States escalation, including the decision in 1961 to increase the number of army "advisers" in South Vietnam, has been in response to escalation on the part of North Vietnam. The requirements for accomplishing the American mission, as Eisenhower defined it in that letter, have been rising; the mission itself is unchanged.

McNamara observed that, when the attack on American vessels in the Bay of Tonkin last summer was met by prompt United States retaliation, such attacks at sea ended. But, he added, "other escalatory events" have not.

The methods of the Vietcong, he said, are a key to understanding the escalation. (Continued on Following Page)

by the other side. The Vietcong mark for death mayors, school board members and other local officials. This tactic not only steadily drains the pool of natural leaders in South Vietnam, but also creates a general atmosphere of fear and physical insecurity.

We can comprehend what this means to public morale, McNamara said, when we recognize that the South Vietnamese have lost 1,800 local officials in a population of 10 million—the equivalent in our own country, which has 20 times as many people, of 32,000 officeholders disposed of.

The attacks on Americans, beginning with the destruction of the barracks at Bien Hoa last October, he went on, are, in effect, saying to the South Vietnamese: See, not even the Americans can protect themselves from the Vietcong. A result, of course, is to increase still further the anxiety of the South Vietnamese people.

NEXT, we turned to the relationship between policy and long-range military plans. Are we, I asked, following a preset schedule of military steps in Vietnam? No, said the Secretary. "The real future must constantly be compared with the forecasted future. When there is a divergence between the two, it is necessary to change either the objective or the means of getting there."

To help "get there," the President, McNamara, Rusk and McGeorge Bundy—sometimes jocularly called "the Awesome Foursome" in lower-echelon Washington—have an informal lunch together every Tuesday. This meal is usually taken in, the President's Dining Room on the second floor of the White House, where the handsome early 19th-century wallpaper shows stirring victory scenes of our War for Independence.

McNamara explained that no decisions are reached at this weekly affair. Its purpose is to "isolate problems" and to inform the President of those that call for special attention. McNamara explained that it provides an occasion for the participants to say to one another: "Dammit, I think we ought to look into this." Decisions, McNamara emphasized, are arrived at in the Cabinet room.

As for his own conduct of affairs, McNamara said he had a bias for action rather than for inaction. "To take no action is to take undecided action," he declared.

Activism sometimes comes high. I asked him how he felt about the scolding references in some quarters to "McNamara's War," reminding him of how the War of 1812 was long remembered as "Mr. Madison's War." It did not bother him, he said, and he explained how the phrase had originated. In November, 1961, in a conversation with President Kennedy, he had "volunteered to look after" the war in Vietnam. In time he made many journeys to Honolulu or Saigon for conferences and on-the-spot investigations. These identified him with the hostilities. He said he recognized no other significance for the sobriquet.

Noticing behind him, in a collection of books, a copy of David Halberstam's recent critical study of United States policies in Vietnam, "The Making of a Quagmire," I asked McNamara where he thought we had gone wrong in South Vietnam. I had in mind, of course, the potential advice he could give the President to protect the rest of Southeast Asia. He thinks it is too early to say if there were other things that could have been done in

Vietnam. Did I have Thailand in mind? Of course I did. He had some ideas on the subject, but at the moment, he said, he did not want to discuss them.

My final question—one I would also put to others—was: Which historical analogy was he finding most instructive and persuasive, the consequence of the appeasement at Munich or the consequence of the Red Chinese intervention in Korea? He focused immediately on the Korean episode, asserting with confidence that any analogy to the situation in Vietnam is "false in logic although significant in psychology." As to a land war—involving the commitment of larger units than we have yet employed, and the engagement of Communist regulars—he appreciated the dangers, but "we are not moving in that direction."

Bundy, the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs. To Bundy I put a line of questions similar to those I had asked McNamara. In response, he, too, spoke of escalation as having been the result of a series of decisions over a long period of time rather than of a sudden change of weather. And no one, he stressed, is happy about the present developments.

I asked Bundy something I had not asked McNamara, and regretted I had not: Was the decision to bomb north of the 17th Parallel restrained until after the 1964 Presidential campaign was over? Bundy's answer was categorical: There was no relationship between the events. Although it had

long been recognized that bombing might be deemed necessary, he said, the President's resolve was to keep looking for a better solution. If bombing had seemed to be the answer earlier, he said, the President would have faced up to it.

Bundy himself headed an interdepartmental study group to re-examine the whole problem in November of last year. Out of it, he said, came a decision to make "a helluva try at stabilizing the political situation" in Vietnam. Bundy, a lawyer, expressed himself in the language of his profession: The United States "couldn't outrun the client."

By the beginning of December, a contingent decision had been made, he went on, that if the military situation did not improve, it might be necessary (Continued on Page 16)

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to bomb and to increase the United States presence there. But the steps agreed upon did not include either bombing Hanoi or using vast American ground forces.

After the Vietcong attack on Pleiku in February, says Bundy, the United States had no alternative to implementing the earlier decision, except to permit a takeover of South Vietnam by Hanoi—or, at best, to watch this being accomplished in installments.

I then asked him a question that assuredly will interest future historians: Was there opposition within the Administration to "going north" (Johnson's phrase, in the late campaign, to describe bombing north of the 17th Parallel)? I was referring to the general awareness in Washington that Under Secretary of State George W. Ball and Soviet specialist Ambassador Llewellyn E. Thompson have argued for more restraint in our military moves.

Bundy responded with aplomb. He called attention to the concern, especially of "Tommy" Thompson, over a possible Soviet response to American air attacks on North Vietnam. While Red China was not expected to react to these attacks, the Soviet Union, it was feared, might take the opportunity to reassert itself as a friend of that part of the world.

After the episode in the Gulf of Tonkin last August, Bundy surmised, Hanoi felt it needed a better air-defense capability. But Khrushchev was still in power and it was not until he was out that Hanoi's requirements had any hope of fulfillment.

I CONCLUDED that the opposition to the bombing was not a major element in the shaping of policy. But I could not be sure. The following day, when I talked to Secretary Rusk, I asked him, too, about internal opposition. He was at pains to say that the advice to the President on the air attacks had been unanimous.

In order to understand better how Rusk develops his advice, I asked him whom he considered his model among predecessors in his office. Unhesitatingly, he named Gen. George C. Marshall. Rusk said he had learned from Marshall that a Secretary of State exists only to serve the President, who has "large, awesome and frightful responsibilities." On this point, Rusk affirmed, there can be no confusion.

Rusk went on to say that if the Secretary is to function properly he must have a stream of ideas and suggestions constantly flowing to him from

mere amanuenses." Rusk conducts his office on these convictions. He relies heavily on his area chiefs—that is, on men like Bill Bundy. They are frequently present at conferences with the President, in order to help express the position of the Department of State. Occasionally, one hears it said that this style of presenting State's point of view weakens the position of State as against Defense, in that it tends to pit an Assistant Secretary against a Secretary. Rusk stoutly asserts, though, that there are better relations between his department and McNamara's "than I have

ever seen or known in Washington before."

WE turned to the war in Vietnam. Rusk spoke with increasing passion to some of the same questions I had asked McNamara and Bundy. The rate of escalation of the war, he said, has been determined by the other side. We have, he maintained, shown "patience and forbearance." We waited six months after the attack in the Gulf of Tonkin before commencing the regular bombing of the North (he did not mention our immediate retaliation, which McNamara had pointed out, had ended the attacks at sea), and we allowed four years to pass after the North Vietnamese declared, as Rusk said, that they were going "to go after the South." (The reference apparently was to the call upon its members in September, 1960, by the Communist party of North Vietnam in Hanoi "to liberate South Vietnam.")

Rusk thought it significant that the latest threat by the Vietcong against the South came after the 1964 election. "Perhaps," he said, "the Communist world misunderstood our Presidential campaign." We declared we did not want a larger war, Rusk reflected, but they thought they could have one.

The Secretary ticked off the various efforts the Administration has made to seek a negotiated settlement, down to the President's offer of unconditional discussions and the temporary suspension of the bombings. There had been no response. Now, he thought, the Vietcong were going to see how well they could make out during the monsoon season which is upon Vietnam.

"Dictatorship," the Secretary went on, "underestimates democracy's willingness to do what it has to do." Since the Second World War, he remarked, a determined use of force had saved Iran, Greece, Berlin, Korea, the Philippines and Malaysia. The underlying conflict, he said, "is between a U.N. kind of world and those trying to build a world revolution." The leaders of the other side laid plans for Vietnam, the Dominican Republic and the Congo. "Their declared doctrine of the world revolution," he insisted, "ought to be as credible as Mein Kampf."

Rusk, like McNamara, minimized talk of a land war. The number of combat troops in South Vietnam, he said, is only one-fifth of the number of our troops in Germany.

While on the subject of Europe, he was anxious to point out that false hopes had been raised about a detente in the cold war. Western Europe

he said, though prosperous, is itself militarily weak; it is still protected by 250,000 soldiers and "lots of megatons on the ground."

The public looks for good news, he said, but "the future cannot be spelled out." The war in Vietnam is "mean and frustrating," yet peace could be achieved in 48 hours if there were a willingness on the other side.

I LOOKED forward now to going to the White House to talk to McGeorge Bundy, whose office is in the basement of the West Wing there, and whose academic specialty, like my own, is the conduct and history of diplomacy. I did not expect language from him different from that which I had heard from McNamara or Rusk, both of whom were also once professors. But I hoped for such special insights as might come from one who has pondered diplomatic documents of other eras. Possibly he would be more consciously aware than the others of how the insistent present becomes the historic past.

Early that morning, I had had an appointment with Bundy, but the very events I was looking for light upon had forced an interruption of our discussion, and a postponement of its completion until late in the afternoon. The cause of the change in plan was a special meeting of the President, Rusk (accompanied by Ball and William Bundy), McNamara, McGeorge Bundy and General Taylor.

Bundy's manner as he prepared for that meeting seemed relaxed. He had come out of his office to hand an agenda to a secretary for typing. While doing this he said to no one in particular, but smiling in my direction, knowing what I had come to discuss: "This morning, above all there will be orderly conduct of foreign affairs." The words had the ring of faculty-table humor rather than of the Government-cafeteria joke.

Inside his office, our conversation had begun with some musings about the study of "decision-making." I ventured the idea that "decision-making" was a new "problem" in our affairs, invented by those who would make a science out of political analysis. Bundy, in agreeing, told of how Dean Acheson had once looked himself up in the index of a book on the subject of decision-making in the Truman Administration, and had learned to his dismay that he had played the role of "a dependent variable."

We had started to drink the coffee which Bundy's secretary had poured for us, when General Taylor, arriv-

ing for the meeting, stuck his head into the office. "I'll be right with you, Max," Bundy said. Bundy and I broke off our talk abruptly.

Eight hours later we began the conversation again. We discussed the place of Presidential advisers in our kind of political system. Bundy pictured them as being like prisms through which public problems are perceived by the President. The President, he said, has to know how to read each of these prisms. Changing the figure of speech to the jargon of the tennis court with which he is very familiar, Bundy said that each man who advises the President has his own particular "spin," which the President has to allow for in receiving advice.

On the other hand, Bundy pointed out, every adviser must appreciate that he is useful to the President only insofar as he attunes himself to the President's needs. Advisers have "got to do things his way." "When you work near the President," Bundy said, "you work for him."

How a President makes his decisions, says Bundy, is unfathomable, and has nothing to do with candor and directness. A President simply makes more decisions than there are ready explanations for. He offered the guess that the reasons for the major decisions of President Eisenhower, who was less a "private man" than most recent Chief Executives, were probably fairly well comprehended by the men around him. Bundy said he thought that, in inscrutability, Franklin D. Roosevelt and President Johnson stand close comparison.

We talked now of the particular decision to bomb North Vietnam. It had been under discussion for about a year, said Bundy. I came back to my question of the relation-

ship between the Presidential campaign and this decision. Bundy thought that, of course, there had been political considerations to take into account. The President would naturally have had to have these elements in mind. Johnson, said Bundy, "is deeply concerned to follow the right road, but not split the country."

ONCE again I raised the question of opposition arguments. Were they being heard by the President? Bundy mentioned memorandums from Senators Mike Mansfield and J. W. Fulbright, which the President had read with care. Walter Lippmann, who is highly dubious of the Administration's policies in Vietnam, comes in to talk with the President "regularly," he remarked. As for contrary opinions within the Administration, Bundy felt that he could not comment.

We touched next on the importance of the history of the fighting in Korea for the shaping of policy today. The "lifeline politicians" (presumably Congressmen) know, he said, that Korea causes pain. But, he added, "Johnson is not terrified by Korea," even though he knows that the issue "shakes the party."

I inquired about Washington's expectations as a result of the bombings in the North.

Bundy replied that Hanoi had reacted as expected, indicating that the bombings were important for maintaining South Vietnamese morale. But, he said, the decisive confrontation with the enemy will have to be in the South.

Because one hears much about Johnson's personal hand in the military operations in Vietnam, even to the point of selecting targets for air strikes, I asked Bundy about his impressions of the usefulness of having the White

House serve as a kind of command post in times of crisis. Bundy, who had seen President Kennedy use the White House in similar fashion during the Cuban missile episode, could speak with some authority.

Obviously, he said, battalions in the field cannot be directed from the White House. On the other hand, no longer can the country rely on the method of yesterday, which was to declare war and then allow the military aspects of things to take their course. He recalled the now outworn simplicity of the instructions, General Eisenhower had received in the Second World War; they went something like: "Proceed to Europe and destroy the German armies." Bundy seemed to be saying that every President must hereafter conduct critical phases of his foreign relations in the present fashion, making himself a more active Commander in Chief than was even envisioned by those who wrote this Presidential function into the Constitution.

I went now to another question—one that only Bundy among the Administration's Big Four could answer. What was different in the actual conduct of American diplomatic affairs from how it had

seemed to be from the safety of Harvard Yard?

Bundy thought that three things especially stood out. The first was his recognition of the powerful place of domestic politics in the formulation of foreign policies. Especially did he remark upon the importance of working closely with Congress. The second was the sensitivity of the press, although, in an aside, he added that the press is probably not as important as it thinks itself to be.

Above all, though, Bundy said he had acquired a larger respect for the role of the United States in the world, and for its influence on events when Americans make up their collective mind to do something. He remembered a visit to a Harvard seminar by John Foster Dulles when he was Secretary of State. It was during one of the crises over Quemoy and Matsu, and students as well as Professor Bundy were critical of the Administration's determination to prevent the seizure of the islands by Red China. Bundy now appreciates the import of what Dulles said on that occasion, which was that, despite Harvard seminarians, he was not worried about the response of the American people.

Bundy said he had come to accept almost what he had

just, in the final analysis, the United States is the engine of mankind, and the rest of the world is the train—explaining that he was not expressing chauvinism but simply passing judgment on the usefulness to the world of American energies.

As I left Bundy's office, I glanced at the signed photograph he has of former Secretary of State—and War—Henry L. Stimson, whose biography Bundy had written. Stimson's stand against Japanese aggression in Manchuria in 1931 somehow seemed lively and relevant again—like Acheson's on the Berlin blockade and Dulles's on the offshore islands.

I had expected to see President Johnson late the following morning but he ran behind his calendar and then had a meeting of the National Security Council at noon. While I waited for an opening in his schedule, I had lunch in the White House mess with Bill Moyers and Moyers's assistant, Hayes Redmon.

Moyers, just turned 31, is the President's principal assistant. It struck me as we talked that he is probably the youngest man of power and influence in the executive branch since John Hay became Lincoln's assistant private secretary at the age of 23. I do not doubt, however, that Moyers, as the President's domestic-policies man, has a far more significant role in our affairs than Hay ever had. Furthermore, since the attack on Pleiku, Moyers is consulted more and more on foreign policy and now attends all meetings the President has with his principal advisers in this field. Across Moyers's desk comes almost every document that the President sees. Moyers's answers to my questions seemed straightforward and willing, even allowing for the fact that he is *parti pris*.

At no point in the Vietnam crisis, said Moyers, has the President made a war-or-peace decision. The step-up of the fighting after Pleiku seemed only a promising option in ending the threat to South Vietnam. Moyers believes, he said, that the North Vietnamese misunderstood the meaning of the Congressional resolution in support of the President, passed after the incident in the Gulf of Tonkin. They took it, he thought, as a *pro forma* expression of American patriotism. (In the instant he was speaking I recalled Dean Rusk's statement that Hanoi had not understood, either, the meaning of our election campaign. I could not fail to wonder if there are signals from the other side we may also be misreading.) The current phase of the fighting was triggered by the attacks at Bien Hoa and Pleiku.

I asked Moyers whom the President relies on most heavily for advice. He replied that the President is not "the prisoner of any one man." In addition to depending on the officeholders I had spoken to, the President talks to many other people in and out of Government service, including especially Dean Acheson. Moreover, at the President's weekly breakfasts with Congressional leaders, more than half of the conversation in-

versation turned to George Ball. Moyers described Ball as a "necessary and effective devil's advocate," "seeking diplomatic and political options which might be pursued." And, he said, Ball is listened to. Recently, Moyers recounted, some military advisers felt that the time had come to bomb closer to Hanoi than we had yet gone. Ball's persuasive arguments against such a plan were important, as the President decided at the last minute.

Furthermore, Johnson sometimes calls Llewellyn Thompson directly, in order to discuss policies as they affect the Soviet Union. The phone calls run in the other direction, too. The Joint Chiefs,

for example, can be in touch with the President without going through McNamara. Moreover, Moyers said, any President "would be a fool if he worshiped the system, and thus denied himself sources except those at the top of the greasy pole."

Moyers described the President's skill in forcing his subordinates to look for optional solutions to the problems at hand. He is constantly probing. By actual count, Moyers said, the President had asked 41 questions at the meeting on Vietnam the day before—the one which had interrupted my talk with George Bundy.

Johnson devours reports and memoranda with incredible dispatch, but he is not a reader of books. Yet he learns from history. Moyers says the President is much guided by the American experience of the thirties and forties. The isolationist sentiment of those years, the President believes, greatly misled the Germans. Moyers said that the President admires the way Franklin Roosevelt walked the line between the absence of Congressional support and the necessity of providing moral and material support to the British people in 1940-41. Moyers also said that to Johnson "Roosevelt is a book to be studied, restudied and reread."

Just as lunch was ending,

word arrived that the meeting of the National Security Council had ended, and that the President would see me now. When I arrived at the oval office, he stood in the doorway reading a paper. Quickly finishing, he shook my hand cordially and we went inside. He sat down in his rocker facing the fireplace wall, and motioned me to sit on the sofa.

THE President knew what I had come to ask him about. I knew that he had to be in Houston before the afternoon was over in order to greet the Gemini astronauts. I therefore went immediately to the point: In the long history of the making of fateful Presidential decisions we have scarcely any record taken contemporaneously from the Chief Executive himself as to how it goes. Mr. President, will you tell me what it is like?

He took a glass of root beer in his hand. He was somber as he said he had just left General Taylor, who was now separated by war from his wife for the third time in their lives.

The President pointed to a report on his desk. It was, he said, a statement of General Westmoreland's recommenda-

tions as to what forces he will require to succeed in his mission in Vietnam. The President said he would study it on the airplane trip to Texas and over the weekend. He would have to decide by the next Monday or Tuesday. He said it would not be an easy decision and proceeded to tell me why.

He talked generally of his options in Vietnam. He had two, both of them more provocative than present policy. There is, he said, the right-wing solution, which would be a nuclear solution. And, of course, we could pull out—which, he said, is really what Senator Morse and Walter Lippmann want. Neither of these alternatives being satisfactory, what are we to do? Should our forces just "hunker up and take it?" Clearly, no.

But what is to be done? "What will be enough, and not too much?" "I know that the other side thinks it is winning the war out there," he said in a tone of tough realism. Then, more pensively, he said: "No man wants to trade when he's winning." In this case, we have to apply pressure "until he sobers up and unloads his pistol."

It is not easy to send Americans to the jungles of Vietnam, the President said. He wrestles with each decision night and day, whether it is to bomb or to build up

the strength of our combat troops.

Only this morning, the President said, he had heard Mrs. Johnson awakened by her maid. He called to his wife to inquire why she was up so early. She replied that she had an appointment in connection with the beautification program. But, why, she wanted to know, was he awake so early?

The President answered, he said, that he was lying awake thinking of how he would feel "if my President told me that my children had to go to South Vietnam in a Marine company to do 'whatever was necessary to prevent aggression'—and possibly die."

The President talked mournfully of the men who had been killed in action during the previous night—who, he said, meant as much to their mothers and wives as his daughters mean to him. Grieved by the loss of over 300 men, the President went on to say that the toll in a larger war would be far greater. "And no one knows this better than I do."

"tucking tail and coming home." It was his responsibility, he said, to decide how to avoid that necessity. This was the business of the weekend.

Down at the ranch, the President said, he wanted to think, "to smell some bluebonnets, watch the deer and the antelope, and get some sand between my toes." He was going, he said, softly, to visit the graves of his parents and grandparents. (Later he said he was also going to do some "hard praying.") He wanted "to roam by the river with nobody but a dog for company." In this setting he would try to decide. Then, one guessed, the tension would be over, because he said solemnly: "I'm never bothered about a decision I know is right."

THE process of deciding was patently under way already, for the President was musing: "When I land troops they call me an interventionist, and if I do nothing I'll be impeached."

The President now talked with feeling and pride of his 34 years in Washington, which, he pointed out, began when Hitler was rising to power, and of his long experience in wrestling with diplomatic and military problems. He mentioned how President Roosevelt had wanted him on the Naval Affairs Committee, because we had "gotten rid of the Navy" and it had to be rebuilt. He mentioned "the Nyes, the Borahs, the LaFollettes and Chamberlains"—as if the whole panorama of the isolationist years had come alive for him again.

Asking for more root beer, the President went on. He had persuaded Cordell Hull to write a letter in August

1941, in support of the extension of the draft law, which Speaker Rayburn read in the House just before the extension was passed by one vote. The President would like to think, he said, that his action in prompting that letter had changed "at least one vote."

I FEAR I interrupted the President in order to go to another subject. On whom did he model himself, if on anybody, in the making of decisions? What could he learn from his predecessors in the White House?

He went to the second question. Mentioning Washington and Jefferson quickly, he said he liked Jackson's decisions. Then he skipped to Woodrow Wilson. Had he met him, I asked. No, but his father had, and had talked about him at home. Johnson said he admired Wilson's idealism. Like today, the President added, we might have avoided war if our intentions had been clear. But, he reflected, "the Kaiser thought we wouldn't fight."

The President left no doubt that Roosevelt is his prime model and example. He remarked that Roosevelt's portrait hangs across from him in the Cabinet room. He reminisced about the frequent Sunday lunches he had had with Roosevelt, during the war years. A "perceptive man," he called him, who was "determined once a decision was made."

He had learned much from his German grandmother, too, he said. She had taught him caution, he was sure: "Stop, look, and listen, and count to ten."

I introduced Lincoln's name. I am certain I had in mind Lincoln the war leader. But the President appeared to think only of Lincoln the emancipator. Lincoln, he said, "walks along the corridors with me; the Emancipation Proclamation is being made a fact."

To complete his reflections on the Commanders in Chief who have preceded him, Johnson said he had worked with Eisenhower on Lebanon, Suez and Vietnam. He had also "tried to comfort" Kennedy after the Bay of Pigs.

HAVING paid tribute to the past, the President turned once again to the heaviness of his responsibilities. He drew from his pocket a piece of White House notepaper, which, judging from its appearance, had not recently been placed there. The President read it aloud to me:

Behind every enterprise stands the man who is ultimately responsible. The eager and able men on his staff spin golden dreams and propose new plans. They fret while he ponders. But to him, deliberation is sweet. He knows that success will have many share-

holders, but that failure will be the sole property of the man responsible.

The President handed me the paper, telling me I could send it back to him when I was finished with it. (The authorship of the quotation is uncertain.) The President now stood up, and as he did so he asked Marvin Watson, an assistant, who had just entered the office, to obtain for me a copy of the statement by "the Roman general."

Watson brought me copies of three documents which are

in frames on the wall above the President's desk in the small auxiliary office adjoining the oval office, where, Mr. Johnson said, he works late at night. One is a portion of a speech by a Roman consul of the second century B.C., headed: "A Roman General's Opinion of 'Military Critics'." Another contains words by Edmund Burke on the thick skin required by public men. The third is a quotation from Lincoln in the same vein.

The President took me into the auxiliary office—which he calls "my little office." I had the feeling that he wanted to show me where he makes some of his decisions. As his attention turned once more to decision-making, he spoke again of his family—of his wife and mother and father. He stated that before his mother died he always checked his decisions with her. As he talked we stood almost nose to nose.

Polltely, the President asked me if I had any further questions. I did not feel I ought to try to keep him longer, and we said good-by.

THERE is no single set of conclusions to be drawn from this series of conversations. But a few things seem certain.

The men around the President do not speak of conquest on the battlefield in Vietnam—as men from time immemorial have talked of victory—because they are honest men and know that there can be none. Nevertheless, they exude at every pore the resolution of people who do not mean to get licked, either. It may be said that beyond the specific advice they offer the Presi-

dent daily, they reinforce, without turning into sycophants, his own resolve to see this terrible episode through. They are sensitive to the fact that they, too, are accountable to history.

As for the President, he leaves the unmistakable impression that he is his own man, his own "decider." The day before I was in his office, for example, McNamara had informed him of Gen. Earle Wheeler's views on the Westmoreland report. Wheeler being out of town, Johnson said he would wait until Wheeler returned in order to hear his opinions at firsthand.

Johnson is also a man of peace, despite the two-gun impression of him that the world has recently gained. ("God knows peace would be so sweet to us," he had said at one point in our conversation.) It seems ludicrous to call him, as, for instance, one critic recently called him in London, "the gendarme of the world counterrevolution."

Moreover, despite his earthy language and regional drawl, which he is the first to recognize are handicaps in the traditional conduct of diplomacy—if not of war—he knows there is a world beyond the Pedernales, or even the Potomac, with which he must come to terms. This may be a neglected but essential point in distinguishing him from the Goldwater people. And his long experience on the Hill, far from being a handicap, is a distinct advantage: It has taught him to learn to look at a proposal from the other person's point of view, even when he must eventually say no.

Johnson's effusiveness sometimes seems "corny"—a particular handicap in establishing a relationship with young men and women that he is well aware of—but it seems to grow out of an overpowering desire to take people into his confidence by embracing them. It may in fact be a substitute for the people's affection, which Johnson craves and which so far eludes him. But he is as determined as the Roosevelt who fascinates him might have been to be unflinching in the face of the grievous long-standing problems it is his destiny to fall foul of.

In the President's private quarters in the White House hangs a photograph of Roosevelt talking to Johnson, taken about 30 years ago. The typed caption on the mat, Johnson's own, reads: "I listen." These are remarkably fitting words to describe Johnson's stance at the moment, as a maker of foreign policy. He sits with one ear cocked for whatever counsel he can reach, for whatever increase in the available options he can produce. And with the other ear he strains to hear a sound, however faint, from Peking or Hanoi, that the hour has arrived at last to sit down and talk.

MAY SOON DOUBLE FORCE IN VIETNAM

Ground Artillery Fire Into
North Is Also Suggested
by Minority Leader

COMMENTS A SURPRISE

He Speaks to Press After
House Republicans Take
a Questioning Stand

By MAX FRANKEL

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, June 24 — The Senate minority leader, Everett McKinley Dirksen, raised the possibility today that the United States would soon double its forces in South Vietnam—to presumably at least 120,000 men—and begin ground artillery fire across the border into North Vietnam.

The Illinois Republican, who has warmly supported and served President Johnson in the Vietnam crisis, strolled into the Senate press gallery this afternoon to circulate these suggestions without making it clear whether he spoke on behalf of anyone in the Administration.

Senator Dirksen's statement had the effect of stealing the spotlight from a small group of Senate liberals who had earlier taken the floor to deplore the intensification of the war and to demand further debate in Congress.

Strategy in Crossfire

It also tended to undermine the strategy of prominent House Republicans, who had questioned the wisdom of committing more United States troops and requested clarification of the Administration's ultimate goals in Vietnam.

Mr. Dirksen said the suggestions for a still wider involvement had grown out of an inspection trip to Vietnam by the former Secretary of the Army, Robert T. Stevens, a Republican, who reported to a meeting of the Senate's Republican policy committee on Tuesday.

Mr. Stevens visited Vietnam during the week of June 6. He was on a business trip today for his textile company, J. P. Stevens & Co. and could not be reached for comment. Mr. Dirksen said he thought Mr. Stevens had gone to Vietnam at the request of the Defense Department.

A department spokesman denied this, saying Mr. Stevens had traveled on his own and had presented some suggestions

DIRKSEN SUGGESTS A DOUBLED FORCE

Continued From Page 1, Col. 8

to the Secretary of Defense, Robert S. McNamara, after his return last week. The Pentagon was said to have had no advance knowledge of Mr. Dirksen's statement.

The Administration has a standing policy against any comment about "future operational matters."

Whatever the origin of the suggestions, Senator Dirksen appeared to be endorsing them. He praised Mr. Stevens's judgment and knowledge of military affairs. More troops, combat as well as supporting units, Senator Dirksen said, are needed because of the "very dangerous and serious" situation that Mr. Stevens found.

Calls Plain Necessary

In addition, Senator Dirksen went on, the former Army Secretary had found a need for a special effort "to grab off a chunk of coastal plain" just below the 17th Parallel—the border between North and South Vietnam—from which long-range artillery could be fired into the North.

The United States began in February to attack North Vietnam from the air but has not done so on the ground although there have been reported infiltrations by small raiding parties.

Mr. Dirksen opposed two of the principal suggestions about Vietnam made by his liberal colleagues. He said he opposed any dealings with the Vietcong, even if in negotiations they appeared as part of North Vietnam's delegation. He also expressed doubt about the need for another resolution of Congress on the subject and about the wisdom of the kind of debate that would injure the morale of United States soldiers in Vietnam.

A debate, on the floor was led by Senator Frank Church, Democrat of Idaho, one of the moderate but persistent critics of Administration policies. His main purpose in speaking out after a four-month silence, he said, was his strong feeling that "further acceleration of the war northward should be resolutely resisted."

Mr. Church said he respected President Johnson's difficulties and desire for peace but he expressed apprehension about the drift of events. He urged the Administration to solicit some kind of United Nations involvement in the search for peace, to affirm more formally its willingness to deal with the Vietcong as part of any Communist delegation and to advocate "genuine self-determination" for the people of South Vietnam.

'Mock Parliament' Feared

Above all, Senator Church urged continued and full debate lest Congress become a "mock parliament." He also urged the United States not to keep the warring Vietnamese factions—Saigon, the Vietcong and Hanoi—from exploring the possibilities of agreement among themselves. And he asked the Administration not to confuse an exercise in power politics with a fight for freedom, contending that the regime in Saigon was as dictatorial as the one in Hanoi.

Senator Jacob K. Javits, Republican of New York, supported Mr. Church's expressions of concern by offering a resolution of support for the Administration.

Without taking a position on the wisdom of intensifying the war, Senator Javits said some "nagging and worrisome" questions ought to be answered before the nation marched down a road along which it could not easily return.

To spur a full debate in both houses of Congress, he said, he was renewing his proposal that the legislators consider a new resolution supporting President Johnson's use of force as now contemplated and designating a cease-fire and negotiations as the objectives of policy.

Calls Old Move Outdated

A resolution last August, when the current degree of involvement was not foreseen, has become "outdated," Senator Javits said. It was not enough of a mandate for measures that risk a major conflict, he added, and "neither is a Gallup poll."

He said he wanted to know whether it was clear that the South Vietnamese people still wanted the United States in their country, at whose invitation the nation was now fighting there and what practical possibilities existed for regional or United Nations action.

Senators George McGovern of South Dakota, Gaylord Nelson of Wisconsin, Joseph S. Clark of Pennsylvania and Frank E. Moss of Utah, all Democrats, supported parts of Mr. Church's proposals, especially those calling for more discussion. Several also linked praise of Senator Church to praise for Senator Robert F. Kennedy's speech yesterday urging greater priority for measures to halt the spread of nuclear weapons.

ARMS BUDGET RISE URGED BY STENNIS

He Says U.S. Faces 'Critical Problems' in Vietnam

By MAX FRANKEL

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, June 25 —

Defense Secretary Robert S. McNamara was urged by a leading Democratic Senator today to raise the coming year's military budget to avert "critical problems" in combat in South Vietnam.

Senator John Stennis of Mississippi, chairman of the Preparedness subcommittee of the Senate Armed Services Committee, said the unexpected intensification of the war had left the military services "delicately balanced" between "adequate strength and serious weakness."

The Defense Department issued an immediate reply reiterating Mr. McNamara's contention that his \$49 billion budget would be sufficient to continue the strengthening of the nation's over-all military posture to carry out whatever combat operations were likely in the year beginning July 1.

The department's legal right to move funds within the budget would enable it to meet all foreseeable requirements until Congress returns next January, the Pentagon added, at which time it could act on a supplementary appropriation if needed.

Mr. Stennis's challenge to the adequacy of the military budget echoing the sentiments of prominent House Republicans—came amid more signs here today that additional United States forces would soon be sent to Vietnam.

100,000-Man Goal Hinted

Administration officials said they knew of no decision to double the American force, which was suggested yesterday by Senator Everett McKinley Dirksen of Illinois, the Senate Republican leader. But an increase past the announced goal of 75,000 men was acknowledged with some sources hinting at a figure near 100,000.

Mr. Dirksen said he had received no complaints from the executive branch for signaling a further United States involvement. He said he thought his disclosure had been right down President Johnson's "alley" because he was merely "warning the country that there are going to be more men out there."

Officials here also tacitly acknowledged that South Korea was planning to send a reinforced division of about 15,000 men to South Vietnam this summer.

Administration sources have been reluctant to discuss this project on the ground that it involves two other governments. Apparently, the Korean division is being sent to avoid the withdrawal of one of the two United States divisions stationed in South Korea.

Mr. Stennis's call for a re-

nis did not say how much of an increase he would propose.

House Republicans, led by Melvin R. Laird of Wisconsin and Glenard P. Lipscomb of California, have charged in recent weeks that the defense budget had been kept artificially low for political purposes. They have predicted that at least \$1 billion more would be sought from Congress before January.

The Administration recently requested and received an additional total of \$700 million for the current year's \$69 billion budget, largely for Vietnam activities. Of this amount, about \$500 million will remain available for spending in the coming fiscal year.

Mr. Stennis said the budgets for 1965 and 1966 were peacetime budgets developed long ago. The drain of Vietnam operations on military resources is "substantially greater than is generally recognized," he said, and "could become critical in the months to come even if our activities should continue at the same level."

There is no "fatal deficiency or shortage now," the Senator asserted. But, in view of the delay between the appropriation of funds and the delivery of weapons to troops, he said "further delay will be an un-

warranted and risky gamble with our national security."

In reply, the Pentagon pointed to a previously published letter from Secretary McNamara to Representative George H. Mahon of Texas, chairman of the House Appropriations Committee, who had asked him to comment on the adequacy of the 1966 budget. The letter was dated June 9.

Mr. McNamara strongly implied that there probably would have to be a supplementary appropriation early next year but that he thought it best to await developments.

He wrote that the budget was adequate at the present time.

CASE NO. 9373-WMB
U.S.A.
 VS. Russio
 DEFENDANT'S EXHIBIT N^o 21
 DATE _____ IDEN. _____
 DATE _____ EVID. _____
 Clerk, U.S. District Court, Central District of California
 BY _____ Deputy Clerk _____

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7-12-65 p. 1

Limited Reserve Call-Up To Support Vietnam Seen

Rise in Defense Budget to Meet Commitments Is Believed Necessary

By HANSON W. BALDWIN

A limited call-up of reserves and a sizable increase in the 1966 defense budget will soon be necessary to support the war in Vietnam, in the opinion of many high-ranking officers and Congressmen.

President Johnson indicated last week that the United States commitment to South Vietnam would have to go well beyond the present publicly announced goal of 75,000 men. In fact, officers say, forces already in Vietnam, plus those on the way or programmed, would bring the total of United States ground troops in South Vietnam to somewhere between 100,000 and 150,000.

Most of the Third Marine Division is already in Vietnam and major elements of the First Marine Division, normally stationed in California, are being moved to Hawaii and Okinawa to replace it. Troops of the Army's First Infantry Division arrived yesterday in Cam Ranh Bay for duty in Vietnam, members of the 101st Airborne Division are on the way and

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A LIMITED CALL-UP FOR VIETNAM SEEN

Continued From Page 1, Col. 6

eventually the entire divisions are expected to be shifted there. The First Cavalry Division (Air Mobile) at Fort Benning, Ga., is tentatively earmarked for movement later this year to Vietnam.

Thus, two or three of the Army's 18 divisions and one of the Marines' three divisions are already programmed for Vietnam, but no additional forces have been provided to assume other commitments, such as furnishing troops for a sizable replacement and training base, continental and hemispheric defense, and so on.

Similarly the Navy and Marines and to a lesser extent the Air Force have found themselves spread thin by the increasing demands of Vietnam. A rigid budget and personnel ceiling has been set without allowing for the major increases in United States commitments there that have occurred this year. The Navy's Seventh Fleet is now employing four, and at times five, aircraft carriers off Vietnam, and a new naval patrol command off the South Vietnamese coast has created an additional strain.

Many high-ranking officers have been quietly urging for some time either a mandatory extension of service enlistments or a selective and limited call-up of Ready Reserves, or both. They see no other way to meet the personnel emergency created by the Vietnamese war, the troop requirements in the Dominican Republic and all the other commitments the United States has throughout the world.

A call-up of the Reserves, as well as mandatory extensions of enlistments, would be the quickest way to provide trained men for the armed forces. The draft, which has been utilized so far only by the Army, can, under existing law, supply any number of recruits to all of the armed services as needed. But the inductees would require several months—or, if specialists, a year or more—of training before assignment to units.

Draft calls in recent months have been increased slightly, and if Reserves were called up probably would be increased again, in time to provide replacements. But the only way to provide additional organized units and trained personnel quickly is by a Reserve call-up.

During the last week in particular Washington has hummed with reports and rumors of partial mobilization measures. It was learned that a number of different alternatives were under serious discussion, but apparently President Johnson had reached no final decision at the weekend as to what course he would follow. It seemed likely that he would await the report of Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara and the new Ambassador-designate, Henry Cabot Lodge, who are visiting Vietnam this week.

2 Alternatives Listed

Mr. Johnson, as President, has the power to call up Ready Reserves in peacetime involuntarily for no more than 15 days' active duty—which is the normal period for summer training. If he wishes to retain the reserves on active duty for a longer period than this he must do one of two things: Issue an Executive order declaring a state of emergency; or request Congress to approve a joint resolution authorizing the induction of reserves.

President Kennedy took the latter course during the Berlin crisis. Either course, unless the President deliberately asked Congress for a smaller figure, would enable the White House to call to active duty for no more than 24 months up to 1,000,000 Ready Reserves; those Reservists or National Guardsmen in organized units or with an active or formal military obligation.

The Navy is the only service, under present law, that can mandatorily extend enlistments without further action by Congress or the President.

The need for more men to build up ships' complements closer to wartime strengths, the necessity for retaining specialized skills and the increasing requirements for coastal patrol craft and other naval activities in Vietnam indicate that if Presidential approval is received, the Navy may well extend enlistments and at the same time call up a limited number of reserves.

Similarly, the Marines need more men to provide replacements for casualties and sick in Vietnam, and probably to flesh out the existing cadre—headquarters and key personnel—of a fourth Marine division, which could, if necessary, replace the First Marine Division, now moving to the Western Pacific.

The Army feels strongly that it needs to keep its strategic reserve in this country at strength, despite the calls upon it made by Vietnam. To replace the two, three or more Regular Army divisions being shifted to Vietnam from this country, the Army would like to call up some National Guard divisions or equivalent units.

It points out that two United States divisions in Korea, and five in Germany, plus two or three in Vietnam, and part of one in the Dominican Republic

leaves the "pie cut pretty thin" with only four or five divisions left for global emergencies. The 25th Division in Hawaii is now the only reserve the Army has in the Pacific area, and it probably must remain in place against the danger of an emergency in Korea. Thus, the likelihood of a limited reserve call-up becomes greater and greater as more and more troops are shifted to Vietnam.

For the Air Force the need for reservists would probably be limited chiefly to individual specialists and to air transport and tactical wings.

In addition to the personnel squeeze now becoming more and more acute, many officers and Congressmen are increasingly concerned about money limitations, equipment shortages or inadequacies and the "unprogrammed" nature of the Vietnam war. As one observer put it the military budgets have been built on assumptions of expenditures that applied to Vietnam about two years ago.

No allowance, except one \$700 million supplemental budget in the 1965 fiscal year, has been made for the great escalation in Vietnam. The war has been financed by "robbing Peter to pay Paul," as one observer put it, or taking out of one pocket and putting it into another.

For instance, automotive and communications equipment, helicopters, B-57 aircraft and Army light aircraft have been shifted from National Guard units to the Regular Army and Air Force without replacement. Supply stockpiles have been reduced, training equipment tapped and other expedients taken to provide enough modern equipment for Vietnam.

Senator John Stennis, Demo-

crat of Mississippi, chairman of the Senate Preparedness Investigation subcommittee, has long had investigators looking into this situation and he and a number of his fellow Senators have expressed much concern. Some Senators, including a number of Democrats, have expressed a conviction privately that the 1966 military budget must be increased initially by at least \$1 billion.

So far the Senate has taken the lead in this effort, but the same point of view expressed by Mr. Stennis has been advanced by Republican Representatives Glenard P. Lipscomb of California; Melvin R. Laird of Wisconsin and William E. Minshall of Ohio, members of the House Subcommittee on Defense Department Appropriations.

Build-Up in Vietnam

The most recent visit of Secretary of Defense McNamara and Ambassador-designate Lodge to Vietnam has come at a time when the Vietnamese war appears to be escalating to the proportions of a different and more sinister Korea. It comes, too, after both President Johnson and Mr. McNamara have warned the nation that the limited reserve call-up, extension of enlistments and increased draft calls might be necessary.

Plainly, the visit marks the failure of one policy and the substitution of another. Until now, the policy the United States has been following in Vietnam was based upon a plan evolved by Gen. Maxwell Taylor, who, when he was chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, vigorously opposed large commitment of American combat units to the Asiatic continent.

It is now clear that President Johnson is formulating a Vietnamese policy geared to the concept of committing increasing numbers of ground troops to offensive operations against the Vietcong in the south and to severing the Vietcong supply lines to the north. Public thinking is being prepared for a build-up of American military strength in Vietnam to something in the neighborhood of 200,000 men, and there is no certainty that even that will prove enough.

Escalation has its own perverse logic; the less effective it proves, the more insistent become the demands to do more and more. This is among the greatest of the dangers against which the United States must guard as it starts down an increasingly perilous path in Asia. The bombing of Communist supply lines in North Vietnam has obviously failed to destroy the combat capabilities of the Vietcong—so now demands are heard for bombing Hanoi and Haiphong and thus vastly increasing the threat of direct intervention by Peking and Moscow.

It is obviously futile to bemoan the past miscalculations that have contributed to making the present options so somber; the immediate problem is to make sure that new investment in men and matériel is made on terms that offer maximum hope for effectiveness at minimum cost in casualties and minimum risk of extending the war.

To send large numbers of American troops into the jungles to compete with the Vietcong in guerrilla combat would surely mean heavy losses, with doubtful prospect of discouragement to the enemy. A more promising strategy—and one more likely to hold down the toll in American lives—is that of utilizing overwhelming superiority in air and sea power to retain defensible areas along the coast.

The shakiness of the Government of Saigon and the terrible strain the long conflict has put upon the Vietnamese people complicate the difficulties; but they make even more urgent the broad endeavor this country has initiated to develop programs for raising economic standards in Vietnam and Southeast Asia.

In the United States, now facing—as in the Berlin crisis—a limited mobilization, there must be immediate attention by Congress and the Pentagon to the serious personnel and matériel deficiencies, not only of the regular services but also of the National

Herein, of course, lies another danger, probably the most serious of all. As the American land force commitment in Vietnam increases, so does the likelihood of Communist military pressure in one or another part of the world where the United States is equally committed—and with better reason. If the United States does become enmeshed in this major land war in Southeast Asia, the temptation is obvious to Communist China to exert pressure in Korea, and to the Soviet Union to do the same in Berlin—two tigerbox areas where the American commitment is even deeper than in Vietnam, and the American interest more vital.

NYT

6-15-65 p. 1

Portions of 3 U.S. Divisions Reported Going to Vietnam

Alerts at Bases in Kansas,
Georgia and Hawaii
Rumored in Capital

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, June 14—

Rumors circulated in the Pentagon today that contingents of three Army divisions were being alerted for probable assignment to Vietnam. The divisions are the First Infantry, based at Fort Riley, Kan.; the 11th Airborne, at Fort Benning, Ga., and the 25th Infantry, at Schofield Barracks, Hawaii.

The Pentagon, which has a security policy of declining to confirm or deny troop movements, refused to comment on the reports. Administration officials have made plain that combat reinforcements are planned for the 16,000 marines and paratroops now in South Vietnam.

The rumors coincided with the first significant signs of potential Republican opposition to the Administration's Vietnam policies, which came in reaction to the commitment of American ground troops to open combat in the war.

Representative Melvin R. Laird of Wisconsin, chairman

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MORE U.S. TROOPS MAY BE ASSIGNED

Continued From Page 1, Col. 6

of the House Republican Conference, warned, "We may be dangerously close to ending any Republican support of our present Vietnam policy."

The possibility exists, he said, "because the American people do not know how far the Administration is prepared to go with large-scale use of ground forces to save face in Vietnam."

Mr. Laird protested that the Administration was "needlessly sacrificing" American lives if its only objective was to achieve a negotiated settlement establishing a coalition government with Communist representation.

The warning by Mr. Laird, one of the most influential Republicans in the House, was viewed on Capitol Hill as the first significant indication that a partisan issue may develop over Vietnam.

Opposition on Two Sides

The Laird warning appears to catch President Johnson even more on a political whipsaw. The liberal flank of the Democratic party criticizes him as too warlike and urges him to seek a negotiated settlement. Now the Republican side criticizes him if he does not use American military power in Vietnam to achieve an all-out victory.

The implication of the statement by Mr. Laird was that he would not disapprove the use of ground forces in combat so long as the objective was to achieve "victory over the Communist insurgency."

For the moment, however, it appears that the Republicans are divided on whether to attack the Administration on Vietnam. On the Senate side, Everett McKinley Dirksen of Illinois, the Republican leader, said he saw no wavering among Senate Republicans.

"We are going to uphold the President's hand," Senator Dirksen said. "What else can you do in a situation like this?"

Mr. Laird's statement objected not so much to the use of the combat troops as to the ultimate objective of the Administration.

Future Republican support, he said, should be based on the Administration's answer to the question of how far it is prepared to go in large-scale use of ground forces.

In the absence of such an answer, he said, "We can only conclude that present policy is aimed not at victory over the Communist insurgency nor at driving Communists out of South Vietnam but rather at some sort of a negotiated settlement which would include Communist elements in a coalition government."

If that is the objective, he

in the Vietnamese situation serve American and Free World interests and when they do not needlessly waste or endanger American lives."

Troop Movement Expected

KANSAS CITY, Mo., June 14 (AP)—The Kansas City Star said yesterday a major troop movement from Fort Riley, Kan., appeared imminent.

How many men, when they will go or where, The Star's article said, is not known and no one in authority will say.

But townspeople in Junction City, near the base, see all the portents.

Most noticeable, they said, is a long line of railroad cars, loaded with vehicles, on tracks near the military reservation. Townspeople also noted that many soldiers were paid early last month, and many were granted two-week leaves.

They also noted that 200 children of service families were withdrawn from Junction City schools last week.

Division headquarters of the First Infantry Division at Fort Riley did not comment. "The United States Army does not confirm or deny troop movements for obvious security reasons," a spokesman said.

JOHNS STARTS SWEEPING SURVEY OF VIETNAM ROLE

McNamara and Lodge, Back
From Saigon Trip, Attend
White House Session

LONG TALKS SCHEDULED

Decision on Troops Is Due
—Some U.S. Aides Predict
a Build-Up to 200,000

By RICHARD EDER

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, July 21 —

President Johnson began today to fashion a series of major decisions about the United States' military, political and economic involvement in Vietnam.

Six hours after the return of a high-level Saigon mission headed by Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara, the President began intensive discussions with his chief advisers on foreign policy and national security.

The discussions were described by Bill D. Moyers, the White House press secretary, as "a thorough and penetrating review of the many facets of the situation in South Vietnam."

The discussions, which will continue for several days, are expected to be the most searching and thorough analysis so far of the United States position in Vietnam.

New Phase in War

The talks are expected to produce a policy that will take the American war effort into a new phase, Mr. Johnson and his leading advisers have already said that this phase will include an increase in United States forces in Vietnam.

The size of the new military contingents, what they will try to accomplish, what their relationship will be with the South Vietnamese command, and how far Reserve and National Guard units in the United States may have to be mobilized to backstop the fighting units are all questions that are expected to be answered in the next few days.

[In Saigon, American officials declared that a final decision on troop strength rested with President Johnson, but some predicted that the total would rise from the present 73,000 to 200,000 by the beginning of 1966. Page 4.]

In facing the question of how far to take the United States

PRESIDENT BEGINS VIETNAM SURVEY

Continued From Page 1, Col. 8

dent indicated this gravity. The men included Secretary McNamara, Secretary of State Dean Rusk, McGeorge Bundy, Presidential assistant for national security, and Adm. William F. Raborn, Director of Central Intelligence.

Other participants were Henry Cabot Lodge, the new Ambassador to South Vietnam; Gen. Earle G. Wheeler, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; Carl T. Rowan, retiring director of the United States Information Agency; Leonard H. Marks, his successor; George W. Ball, Under Secretary of State, and several top Defense and State Department deputies.

Tomorrow the President is to meet with the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Continuous meetings with those who came to the White House today were indicated by Mr. Moyers, who said that Mr. Johnson was going to spend "quite a bit of time over the next few days" seeing this group and individual members of it.

Mr. Moyers added that the President was not expected to go to Texas this weekend, indicating that the talks might stretch into Saturday and perhaps Sunday.

Economics on Agenda

United States troop commitments and deployment were not discussed at the meetings today, according to Mr. Moyers. The matters discussed were economic assistance and reconstruction in South Vietnam, and an analysis of United States intelligence and propaganda efforts.

Mr. Moyers indicated that the military question would come up tomorrow at the meeting with the Chiefs of Staff.

Other questions involve the relationship of United States and Vietnamese commands. Some United States officials suspect that it will be necessary to set up joint commands in which inevitably the United States would play the major role. This could lead to a full take-over of the war by the United States, a prospect that no one here seems eager to contemplate.

As the policy discussions got under way, the Senate majority leader, Mike Mansfield of Montana, said that with Mr. McNamara's return it was evident that the ground was being laid for a long, hard conflict. It could last not just until the end of the monsoon season but at least several years, he said.

"We are in not for a summer of pain and difficulty but for

ference table," the Senator added.

He called for another effort by Britain to reconvene the Geneva conference on Indochina, of which London and Moscow are co-chairmen. A British attempt to do this failed in April because of Soviet opposition.

Republican leaders, meanwhile, continued their argument that the Administration's line in Vietnam is too soft. The House minority leader, Representative Gerald R. Ford of Michigan, said the United States should seek more than a settlement with North Vietnam. The implication was that he favored crushing the Hanoi Government, a step the Administration has disavowed.

The Senate minority leader, Everett McKinley Dirksen, who has deplored some of his fellow Republicans' criticism, called for restraint in any Congressional discussion of Vietnam.

Saigon Sees Big Build-up

By JACK LANGGUTH

Special to The New York Times

SAIGON, South Vietnam, July 21 — American and South Vietnamese officials were preparing today for at least a doubling of United States forces in Vietnam despite Secretary McNamara's contention that no decision has been reached.

American officials in Saigon assert that a final decision rests entirely with President Johnson, but some of them talk of 200,000 United States troops in Vietnam shortly after the beginning of 1966.

An increase to 200,000 ground troops in South Vietnam would bring the force close to the size employed in the Korean war. In June, 1953, the United States had its maximum number of ground troops — 275,000 — in Korea. The figure does not include Air Force and Navy personnel, whose bases were generally outside Korea.

South Vietnamese sources said their leaders had spoken to the Secretary in terms of the number of United States battalions they required. They indicated that 30 additional battalions, added to the equivalent of two and a half combat divisions now in the country, would raise to six divisions the strength of American combat forces by the end of 1965.

The American mission here is reported to believe that the Vietnamese have underestimated the number of support troops their request would entail.

Even South Vietnamese generals whose pride, xenophobia or concern for their countrymen's reaction has caused them to resist large rise in the number of American troops, have become convinced that such an increase is necessary.

Four Government soldiers for one guerrilla has become the ratio most authoritatively men-

that the 10-to-1 ratio often cited by students of guerrilla warfare was unnecessarily high in South Vietnam.

Now, with the Vietcong fighting more conventionally in units of battalion and regiment size, American planners have reduced their ratio to 4 to 1. Since Vietcong full-time and part-time strength is informally estimated at 200,000, that ratio would require 800,000 anti-Communist troops.

The Government has about 550,000 regular Army and militia troops. The United States has 73,000 more in South Vietnam. Even the planned 100,000-man build-up in South Vietnamese ranks, which is running into difficulties, would leave the Government about 75,000 men short of its minimum needs.

NYT

7-22-65 p.1
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Shortage of Arms and Men Plagues Army and Reserve

By HANSON W. BALDWIN

Increasing concern was being voiced in Washington and elsewhere in the country yesterday about deficiencies in weapons, equipment, training and personnel in the armed forces. The criticism focused primarily on the Army and its reserve components. It was voiced privately by men in uniform and with increasing public vehemence by some members of Congress.

A number of National Guard leaders, asked by The New York Times to comment, expressed particular concern about major shortages of modern equipment and inadequate training of the six-month trainees assigned to Guard divisions.

New Chapter in Vietnam
Maj. Gen. Almerin C. O'Hara, commanding general of the New York Army National Guard and chief of staff to the Governor, said he did not see any difference between the state of readiness of New York Guard units today and their state of readiness at the time of the Berlin crisis in 1961.

He estimated that New York Guard units had less than 50 per cent of the weapons and equipment authorized by war-strength tables of organization and asserted that many of the six-month trainees the Guard was receiving had been inadequately trained.

The increasing complaints reflected a recognition that a new chapter was opening in the Vietnamese war, one that would require greatly increased American efforts. President Johnson and Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara have already warned that a limited call-up of reserves, a mandatory extension of enlistments and increased draft calls and

Continued on Page 2, Column 4

military budgets may be needed.

Pentagon and Congressional sources agreed yesterday that a decision to implement any of these measures was already taken, in principle, when the President determined that past and present policies in Vietnam were not effective. Using rough estimates that 150,000 to 200,000 American troops might be required in Vietnam, the individual services and the Pentagon have been working on various plans contemplating different types of reserve call-ups and additional funds for items in short supply.

These plans will be refined after Mr. McNamara, Gen. Earle

Biggest Call from Army

The largest call-up would probably come from the Army and would utilize both National Guard and Army Reserve personnel. The Army wants both trained individual specialists as fillers and at least partly trained units to replace other Army units now being transferred to Vietnam.

It is believed that as many individual reservists as possible will be called up to fill up Regular Army units and to bring to war strength the below-strength National Guard units that are expected to be federalized. One report indicated that the equivalent of two divisions in units of battalion or brigade size would be mobilized. The objective would be to spread the burden across the country and avoid calling up divisions drawn from any one state.

In the Berlin crisis in 1961, two National Guard divisions were federalized and sent to training camps in this country. In the Korean War, eight National Guard divisions were called up; after training, two were sent to Korea and two to Germany.

As far as could be determined, the size of the Army call-up would be limited to two divisions, or their equivalent, plus smaller supporting units and individual reservists. In addition, it is likely that Marine reservists will be called up to flesh out the cadre of the Fourth Marine Division.

May Summon Pilots

The Navy and Air Force are expected to call up individual reservists with special skills, such as pilots and maintenance and communications personnel, and perhaps some air transport and tactical air support units.

In 1961, the troop list of the Army reserve forces totaled 37 divisions, plus 13 nontactical Army Reserve training divisions. Since then, both the Guard and the Reserves have been reorganized and are supposedly better trained and equipped to mobilize rapidly and supplement the Regular Army's 16 divisions.

Today there are 23 National Guard divisions, plus many smaller independent and supporting units; six Reserve combat divisions and the 13 training divisions. Mr. McNamara has proposed merging all units of the Guard and the Reserve under the Guard's administration and reducing the Army reserve forces to eight divisions

and 16 brigades, but most observers believe the merger will now be postponed, at least until next year.

Of the 29 divisions, only eight, all in the National Guard, have been given a priority status as "immediate reserve" divisions. All the others are so far below strength that they could not be ready for service for many months. Six high-priority National Guard divisions have been authorized to recruit to about 80 per cent of wartime strength; the two others, designated as special purpose divisions for duties in Alaska and the Caribbean, are at about 70 per cent strength.

Under the merger plan, the high priority divisions were expected to be ready for deployment within eight weeks of

CASE NO. 9373-W1113

U.S.A.

VS. Russia

DEFENDANT'S EXHIBIT N27

DATE _____ IDEN.

DATE _____ EVID.
Clerk, U.S. District Court, Central District of California

BY _____
Deputy Clerk

N 27

General O'Hara, speaking of the high priority 42d Division, the low priority 27th and other units in the New York National Guard, expressed particular concern about both the equipment and training of the six-month trainees who form the major part of the Guard's personnel.

He said there was no evidence that new equipment was coming to the Guard in any quantity and that the Guard "hadn't even gotten the M-14 rifle, which is already obsolete." About 20 to 25 modified and rebuilt M-48-A tanks have been received to replace older and worn-out tanks. Artillery is "in bad shape," he said, and communications equipment is "in miserable condition... a patchwork."

He estimated that the Guard divisions, including the 42d, had about a 25 per cent turnover annually and that the replacements, six-month trainees, came to the Guard with very little advanced individual training.

Status of Divisions

The status of the eight Guard divisions surveyed, all of them high priority except the last two special purpose divisions, follows:

42d Infantry Division, New York. Maj. Gen. Martin H. Epery, Rockville Center, commanding. Authorized strength (80 per cent of war strength), 10,992; actual strength, 10,775. Enough equipment for training but not enough for combat. A fairly sizable cadre, including some battalion commanders with combat experience.

50th Armored Division, New Jersey. Maj. Gen. Edward O. Wolf, Short Hills, commanding. Authorized, 11,649; actual, 11,263. Biggest shortages in equipment are aircraft, radar and communications. About 80 per cent of the personnel are six-month trainees; 10 per cent have served with the regular armed forces; 10 per cent have served two years or more in the National Guard.

28th Infantry Division, Pennsylvania. Maj. Gen. Henry K. Fluck, Camp Hill, commanding. Authorized, 10,992; actual 11,394. Signal equipment and other items in short supply. Most men have had six months training; "a lot of people have had combat, but not many have

had training in jungle warfare or combat in tropical climates."

30th Infantry Division, North Carolina. Maj. Gen. Ivan Hardesty, Raleigh, commanding. Authorized 10,989; actual 10,695. Perhaps 15 to 20 percent of the present personnel might have to be replaced if called up because of short enlistments hardship cases and so forth. The chief lack is heavy weapons, particularly artillery. The 30th has 38 tanks, about one-third of the authorized complement. The worst shortage is in radios and signal equipment. Most men have had some training in jungle warfare. It needs 110 junior officers and is estimated ready for deployment within 13 weeks after call-up.

30th Armored Division, Tennessee. Maj. Gen. William R. Douglas, Nashville, commanding. Authorized, 11,643; actual 10,023. Equipment is short. Ranking officers and World War II veterans, but increasingly few in number. A few officers have World War II jungle experience, and some are veterans of the Korean War.

26th Infantry Division, Massachusetts. Maj. Gen. Richard J. Quigley, Wallacetown, commanding. Authorized, 10,992; actual, 11,006. Comment was refused, but same shortages and training deficiencies exist.

38th Infantry Division, Indiana. Brig. Gen. Noble F. Schlatter, Fort Wayne, commanding. Authorized, 9,676 (70 per cent of war strength); actual, 9,463. There is enough equipment for training, not for combat. Particular shortages are in communications equipment and jeeps. This division, earmarked for Panama or the Caribbean, has sent two of its three brigades in the last two years to Puerto Rico for training. It could be ready for combat in about six months.

Shortages in Equipment

47th Infantry Division, Minnesota. Maj. Gen. Donald C. Grant, Golden Valley, commanding. Authorized, 9,613; actual, 9,496. Earmarked for Alaska, it has its worst shortages in signal equipment and helicopters. Many Army units have been "gutted," as one officer expressed it, to supply skills needed in Vietnam. One officer said that for every battalion sent to Vietnam two others in the United States had to be stripped of specialists and of certain types of equipment to bring the overseas battalion to war strength.

National Guard and Reserve units that may be called up will probably be sent in most cases to posts in this country to replace Regular Army troops sent overseas. However, it is conceivable that some units, particularly specialized ones, might be sent overseas.

U.S. PLANS STEP-UP IN TROOPS AND AID FOR VIETNAM WAR

Several Thousand Military
Men to Provide Training
and Protect Installations

TAYLOR LEAVING TODAY

Pearson of Canada Calls for
a Pause in Air Strikes
to Break Stalemate

By JOHN W. FINNEY

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, April 2—The Administration decided today upon an increase in men, money and equipment for South Vietnam to offset the growing strength of the Vietcong insurgents and to increase the pressure upon North Vietnam for a diplomatic settlement.

Among the steps agreed upon by President Johnson and his advisers were the following:

Assignment of several thousand additional troops to South Vietnam to train the South Vietnamese forces and to protect key American installations against attacks by Communist guerrillas. There are 27,500 American servicemen in South Vietnam now, nearly twice the number there a year ago.

Continued American air strikes against North Vietnam, probably of greater intensity and farther north than the bombing raids of the last two months.

With American assistance, a 160,000-man increase in the size of the South Vietnamese military, militia and police forces, which now number about 557,000 men.

Increased economic assistance to strengthen the position of the South Vietnamese Government, particularly in the rural provinces where the Vietcong have been making heavy inroads.

Taylor at Council Meeting

These steps were agreed upon by President Johnson at a meeting of the National Security Council with Maxwell D. Taylor, the United States Ambassador to Saigon.

[Prime Minister Lester B. Pearson of Canada suggested that a pause in the air strikes against North Vietnam might lead to breaking the stalemate in the Vietnam conflict, Page 3.]

Ambassador Taylor, who has been conferring with Administration officials here for the last week, will leave for Saigon tomorrow evening. It was evident that he was leaving with Administration endorsement of almost all the proposals that he brought to Washington for improving the war effort against the Communists.

As Ambassador Taylor noted after a Congressional hearing, the new steps do not represent a "fundamental change in strategy" and are "not sensational in nature."

Basically, the new steps represent a further implementation of the strategy adopted by the Administration after Mr. Taylor's previous visit in December. This strategy called for increasing the size of the South Vietnamese Army to match the growing power and effectiveness of the Vietcong forces as well as air strikes against the north to persuade the Hanoi re-

Continued From Page 1, Col. 3

gime to stop its support of the insurgents and to seek a negotiated settlement.

Administration leaders realize that the strategy of a step-up, particularly where intensified air raids in the north are concerned, carries with it the threat of open intervention by North Vietnam or Communist China.

At a news conference called by the President after the National Security Council meeting, Ambassador Taylor said the chances of intervention by the Chinese or North Vietnamese were "very slight at the present time."

From Congressional sources, however, it was apparent that this threat has begun to weigh heavily on the Administration's thinking to the point that it has developed "contingency planning" as to how many American troops would be needed in the event of Chinese intervention.

Vast Commitment Discussed

Mayor Beverley Briley of Nashville said in a telephone interview that at a White House briefing of mayors Tuesday evening Administration officials had talked in terms of committing 350,000 American troops if Communist China began sending troops into South Vietnam.

It was understood that the same contingency plan was discussed by Ambassador Taylor during a closed-door appearance this morning before a joint meeting of the Senate Foreign Relations and Armed Services Committees.

Senator J. W. Fulbright of Arkansas, Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, said the danger of Chinese intervention was "discussed at great length" by the senators and Ambassador Taylor.

Summarizing the Taylor testimony on the present outlook in Vietnam, Senator Fulbright said it was regarded as "a very serious, very unhappy situation and all are apprehensive about it." The reason for the apprehension, he said, is that the war "can always escalate beyond control."

While supporting Administration policy for the most part,

Senator Fulbright expressed concern that the Administration still had not defined what kind of a political settlement would be "acceptable" in Vietnam.

In contrast to the generally gloomy conclusions drawn by senators and representatives from Ambassador Taylor's testimony on Capitol Hill, the Ambassador presented an optimistic picture at the unusual news conference called by the President in the Cabinet Room after the National Security Council meeting.

Taylor 'Encouraged'

He said he was "very much encouraged" by the new Government of Premier Phan Huy Quat and expressed the hope that South Vietnam was "moving into a period of much greater governmental effectiveness."

In reply to a question about Vietcong inroads, the Ambassador said:

"It is very hard to describe in a single sentence the situation in Vietnam. What may be true in one province may be entirely untrue in the next."

President Johnson, in commenting on a statement yesterday by the British Foreign Secretary, Michael Stewart, that there were "some signs" of a change in attitude in Hanoi, said, "I have no such information."

The Administration stressed today that it planned steps to improve the political, economic and military security and stability of South Vietnam. In fact, General Taylor said, improve

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to emphasize to Hanoi the military threat it faces if it continues its present course in the south. Efforts to improve conditions are planned to prevent Hanoi from getting the impression that political instability in South Vietnam portends eventual victory for the Communists.

To improve the effectiveness of its own forces in South Vietnam, the United States plans to send several thousand additional troops in the next few months.

Included among the additional personnel will be about 1,000 military policemen to provide greater security for American bases. Additional helicopter units will be assigned to improve the mobility of the South Vietnamese forces. There also will be additional personnel to strengthen the rapidly expanded and somewhat understaffed communications and supply systems.

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CASE NO. 9373-WMB
U.S.A.
 VS. Russo
 DEFENDANT'S EXHIBIT N 30
 DATE _____ IDEN. _____
 DATE _____ EVID. _____
 Clerk, U.S. District Court, Central District of California
 BY _____ Deputy Clerk

9,000 U.S. TROOPS LAND IN VIETNAM

Marines Will Guard Site of Air Base to Be Built

By EMERSON CHAPIN
 Special to The New York Times

SAIGON, South Vietnam, Friday, May 7—A strong new force of United States Marines began landing south of Danang today to provide security for the construction of an important new South Vietnamese air base.

[Six thousand marines and 3,000 United States Navy Seabees came ashore, United Press International reported.]

United States military headquarters here, announced that landings of three battalions of marines began at 8 A.M. at Chu Lai, about 60 miles southeast of Danang. It said the reinforcements were being provided at the request of the South Vietnamese Government "as a further step to prosecute the war against the Vietcong."

The landings came less than a day after United States military authorities painted an impressive picture of continuing success in the war against the Communist guerrillas and said it had become evident to both sides "that the South Vietnamese Government is going to win and the Vietcong are going to lose."

Strain Will Be Eased

Construction of the new air base, capable of accommodating jets, in northern coastal area will relieve much of the strain on the severely overcrowded base at Danang. About 9,000 Marines already are guarding the big Danang base and a smaller airfield and communications center at Phubai, near Hue.

The announcement said the incoming marines were accompanied by the headquarters of Third Marine Amphibious Force, bringing control of all marines now in Vietnam under Maj. Gen. William R. Collins, commander of Third Marine Division.

In their comments yesterday on the course of the war, the United States military authorities said South Vietnamese forces, supported by increasing numbers of American troops, had achieved significant successes in the last month.

Vietcong casualties, losses of weapons and numbers of defections showed great increases during April while casualties and weapons losses among Government forces were substantially down.

Though desertions by Government military personnel were said to be disturbingly high, the morale of both military men

'Initiative Paying Off'

"Government forces have the initiative, the Vietcong are not taking the initiative, and the initiative is paying off," he declared.

The spokesman asserted that statistics over many months showed that the side that initiated an action had a 90 per cent chance of success. Of 23 significant military engagements during April, he said, the Government scored 18 victories and had five defeats. Sixteen of the 18 victories were in actions initiated by Government forces.

On the political front, the Armed Forces Council, the military organ that installed the present Chief of State and Government, has dissolved itself, leaving the civilian Cabinet of Premier Phan Huy Quat in full charge.

The disbanding Wednesday was announced at a ceremony yesterday at the Premier's residence attended by the chief of state, Phan Khac Suu, Government officials and leading generals.

Cabinet Is Praised

Maj. Gen. Nguyen Van Thieu, council secretary, said the two-and-a-half-month-old Government had shown itself to be up to expectations and was entitled to bear full responsibility for government. He said the members of the 20-man council wanted to prove that they had no further political ambitions.

In the next few days there will be a major reshuffle of Dr. Quat's cabinet, but the careful balance between conflicting factions and regions will be preserved. A Cabinet readjustment has long been desired but the leadership has been determined to avoid sudden changes.

The data on military operations showed that actions initiated by the Vietcong had dropped from 2,185 in March to 1,080 in April. The total of insurgents killed in action rose from 1,965 to 3,120.

Capability Called High

Discussing consistent reports that the Vietcong had been lying low to prepare for a major offensive, the spokesman declared that "they have the capability to resume operations at a high level." The high command is aware of the possibility of attack and is "taking necessary precautions," he said.

Air strikes against North Vietnam and Vietcong positions in the South continued.

Twenty-five F-105's of the United States Air Force, with about 25 support aircraft, attacked major communication dumps at Phuvu, southwest of Hue, and other targets that were spectacular.

An opera house at Phuvu, southwest of Hue, was destroyed after a series of attacks. Rebels have been killed and large quantities of weapons


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NEW YORK, WEDNESDAY, APRIL 7, 1965.

Defense Department Releases Photo of North Vietnam Bomb Damage



Photograph shows results of bombing raid Friday by U.S. Navy planes on Dong Phuong Thuong. Damage included destruction of central span of bridge over Len River, which carried the only railroad line between Hanoi and Vinh. Defense Department via Associated Press. Radio photo.

AIR STRIKES SPUR SAIGON'S MORALE

Its Troops Also Reported to Be Raising Effectiveness—Red Attacks Rise Again

By JACK LANGGUTH
Special to The New York Times

SAIGON, South Vietnam, April 6—An improvement in the morale and performance of the South Vietnamese Government and its troops has been the chief discernible result of the last month's air strikes against North Vietnam, a senior American military spokesman said today.

He also reported that the number of actions undertaken by the Vietcong was increasing again, after a lull throughout



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The spokesman called the increase in morale and fighting performance "pretty big pluses." He added that "30 days is a pretty short time."

Monthly Review of War

The United States Ambassador, Maxwell D. Taylor, is understood to have stressed increased hopefulness among the Vietnamese military and civilian population during his discussions with President Johnson on the effect of the air strikes.

Assessing those strikes, specialists here on Asian affairs said they believed that North Vietnam could absorb considerable punishment over an extended period without any decisive economic effect. Page 14.]

The military spokesman, offering the United States Military Assistance Command's monthly review of the war against the Communist guerrillas, reported that the number of weapons lost by Government forces was slightly more than double the number lost by the Vietcong, 1,305 to 610.

In February Government troops lost four times the number

Continued on Page 15, Column 3

AIR STRIKES SPUR SAIGON'S MORALE

Continued From Page 1, Col. 4

ber of weapons captured from the guerrillas.

The ratio of fatalities also improved in the Government's favor last month, with almost 2,000 Vietcong reported killed, compared with 730 Government deaths.

The February ratio, with 870 Government soldiers killed and 1,730 Vietcong dead, was about 2 to 1.

The spokesman, lauding the aggressiveness of the South Vietnamese forces, quoted figures to show that the attacking unit generally wins the battle.

"Out of the 11 significant Government-initiated engagements last month," he said, "the Government won them all. But of the seven engagements initiated by the Vietcong, the enemy won five and lost only two."

276 Vietcong Reported Killed

SAIGON, Wednesday, April 7 (AP)—A fierce three-day battle in the swampy rice fields south of Saigon ended last night with 276 Vietcong killed and 33 captured, United States military spokesmen reported today. Six Americans died in the action.

United States B-57 jet bombers pounded Communist positions with tons of explosives during the first major encounter with the guerrillas in months in the Mekong Delta paddies.

Four United States servicemen perished when their helicopter exploded after a hit by Vietcong machine-gun fire. A United States Army officer advising a Ranger battalion and a Navy officer on a Vietnamese gunboat that hit a Vietcong mine were also killed.

South Vietnamese forces lost 16 men killed and 69 wounded in the water and air assault near Vinhloc, 130 miles southwest of Saigon in the heart of the Caumau Peninsula, Government officials said.

At the opposite end of South Vietnam, policemen and troops carried out lightning raids in and around the city of Danang, site of a strategic United States-Vietnamese airbase, in a hunt for Communist terrorists. A total of 122 suspected Vietcong agents were arrested, including the alleged leader of a guerrilla demolition team.



Associated Press

BOMBING RUN IN VIETNAM: South Vietnamese A-1 Skyraider releasing bombs during recent raid on guerrilla stronghold in South Vietnamese jungle. U.S. sources report improvement of morale among troops and civilian population as result of air strikes in North Vietnam.

Build-up

Decisions on Vietnam

Presidential Press Secretary Bill D. Moyers told newsmen he was not at liberty to define the "perimeter of the agenda." He was referring to the top-level meetings on Vietnam at the White House last week. His use of the military term "perimeter" told the tale: One purpose of the meetings was to decide how many more American troops will be sent to fight the Communists.

The meetings began Wednesday with the return of Defense Secretary Robert McNamara from a mission to South Vietnam. They continued throughout the week, with a steady stream of policy makers and security officers flowing in and out of the Cabinet room.

The atmosphere was described with a variety of "crisis" adjectives — secretive, urgent, tense, gloomy. But it was also odd: there were private meetings about which public announcements were made; high officials slipped furtively into the White House, only to have their names revealed by the Press Office. This led one observer to describe the atmosphere as one of "semi-publicity."

President Johnson was said to have retained his buoyancy and sense of humor throughout the deliberations as he went around the octagonal table in the Cabinet room, asking each man his opinion. No decisions were announced by the weekend, but there was a widely-held view that the President already had made up his mind and was merely filling in the details. A Times correspondent put it this way: "The symphony of stepped-up American involvement had long ago been written but much complex orchestration remained. So concluding, the press watched the conductor go off to his Camp David retreat for the weekend." More meetings—and the announcement of decisions—are expected this week.

What follows is an examination of some of the questions that are believed to have been discussed in the White House meetings.

(1) WHAT IS U.S. MISSION?

The prospect of thousands more Americans going to Vietnam has generated wide concern about what the Administration is trying to accomplish. Columnist Walter Lippmann put it this way last week: "The build-up of American forces does not decide the issue—which is whether the troops are going ashore in order to affirm the American presence during a negotiation for a political settlement, or whether they are the vanguard of a crusade to push Communism back of the 17th Parallel, to teach China a lesson, to prove that Americans always win their wars."

The present and previous Administrations have defined the long-range U. S. mission as keeping South Vietnam independent and ending aggression and subversion against the Saigon Government. Secretary of State Dean Rusk reaffirmed this view last week when he said the "central and inescapable fact, the only fact responsible for the presence of U. S. forces in South Vietnam" is that "tens of thousands of trained and armed men were sent down" from North Vietnam to take over the South.

So far the decade-long U.S. commitment—including the build-up of troops which in the latest stage has grown to 73,000 men, and punitive air raids on North Vietnam over the past six months—has neither curtailed the Communist warfare nor persuaded Hanoi to negotiate. Secretary McNamara, noting last week that the situation in South Vietnam in many aspects had deteriorated since his last visit 15 months ago, said: "The size of the Vietcong forces has increased. The rate of operations and the size of attacks have expanded. The disruption of the line of communications by rail, sea and road become more intense. Terroristic attacks have increased."

In the face of this deterioration, the immediate U. S. mission, in the view of the Administration, seems to be to enforce a "holding action" against further Communist gains in hopes that Hanoi will conclude it cannot win a military victory and will agree to negotiate a political settlement.

(2) HOW MANY TROOPS?

The need for a build-up is predicted not only on the increase in Communist strength and operations, but also on a feeling in Saigon and Washington that the South Vietnamese forces, after years of war, no longer have the physical capacity or will to win a decisive struggle against the reinforced Vietcong.

Communist strength now is estimated at more than 165,000 fighters. This compares with the Government's 500,000 regular army and militia troops plus the 73,000 Americans. Mr. McNamara said last week that this is a "totally unacceptable ratio." It is generally

held that a 10-to-1 ratio is necessary to stamp out guerrilla warfare, although many military observers believe that a lower ratio—possibly 4-to-1—might suffice in South Vietnam because of the Vietcong's increasing use of more conventional, open forms of combat.

A factor that was said to be figuring prominently in the Administration's deliberations was the possibility of more regular North Vietnamese Army units entering the conflict. Last week U. S. officials publicly acknowledged what has been reported for some time: that hidden deep in the jungle of the Central Highlands of South Vietnam is at least one full regiment of North Vietnamese soldiers, that the presence of a second regiment is probable, and a third possible.

While there has been no official announcement on the extent and nature of the planned increase in U. S. strength, there has been talk of doubling the American force by the end of the summer and raising it to 200,000 by next January. If Hanoi pours in more troops, the U. S. total could go much higher. At the height of the Korean War, the U. S. had 250,000 men on the ground.

To supply the additional troops in Vietnam, the Administration is said to be considering a limited call-up of reserves and National Guard units and an extension of the draft. Any major diversion of forces to Vietnam from established units would leave gaps in the country's over-all security system.

If a call-up is ordered, military sources in Washington indicated that first look probably would be at six "high-priority" and two "special-mission" divisions of the National Guard. These units have received special training and the most up-to-date equipment.

The possibility of a call-up aroused mixed reaction among the reservists. An enlisted man in New York said, "It doesn't seem fair to call me back when the married guys without children and the so-called students have never had to go at all." A National Guard officer in North Carolina said, "Of course, none of us is anxious to get into war, but we knew we might be called up when we joined the Guard."

(3) WHAT STRATEGY?

There is little question in Saigon that the U. S. is preparing to take over the main burden of the ground war from the South Vietnamese. This raises questions of command, of troop deployment, and of strategy.

The general plan calls for a chain of strong American bases stretching the length of South Vietnam's coast. From these bases, U. S. forces could fan out as needed to hit the Vietcong. It is believed that American offensive operations will begin in earnest when these bases—including ports and airfields—are sufficiently established.

As for deployment and command, it is foreseen that areas of operations will be assigned to the U. S. forces, to which certain South Vietnamese units will be attached, but with Americans as the principal commanders. In regions where both forces have adjoining sectors, joint field commands probably will be established, but no over-all joint command is contemplated.

The probability is that the U. S. forces will be "drawn into" the front lines, with no fanfare. Presumably the South Vietnamese would then be given the primary task of pacifying the country—that is, routing out guerrillas, reestablishing Governmental authority in villages, and providing security in remote areas.

There has been considerable criticism of the Administration's strategy, with the President caught in the middle. Some persons have demanded withdrawal from Vietnam, while others have urged more use of air power as opposed to increased ground troops. The question threatens to become a political issue. (For a report on Senate views on Vietnam, see Page 3 of this section.)

So far the Administration has shied away from bombing Hanoi, as some have suggested, because of the political and moral risks involved. Moreover, U.S. officials feel that the war, in the final analysis, must be won on the ground in South Vietnam.

(4) WHAT HOPE OF TALKS?

Secretary Rusk said again last week that "thus far, [hopes for peace talks] were frustrated by the attitude of Hanoi and Peking." But efforts toward the conference table went forward. A mission from Ghana flew to Hanoi at the invitation of North Vietnamese President Ho Chi Minh, and Ambassador-at-large Averell Harriman concluded talks with Soviet leaders in Moscow. While no change was reported in Russia's Vietnam position, many observers saw signs of a continued U.S.-Soviet détente as a plus factor in chances for an eventual settlement.

The immediate outlook, however, was for a protracted conflict. President Ho said in Hanoi last week that the Vietnamese people

in the North and in the South have "united like one man and are determined to fight . . . until final victory, even if we have to go on fighting for another five years, 10 years, 20 years, or even longer."

SAIGON'S NEW REGIME - WHAT MANNER

By JACK LANGGUTH

Special to The New York Times

SAIGON, South Vietnam, June 26

The new Premier of South Vietnam owns a violet-colored airplane, wears lavender neck scarves and writes love poetry. He also leads bombing raids over North Vietnam, raises fighting gamecocks and promises the swift execution of his enemies.

American officials here haven't made up their minds about him.

The argument could be advanced that when the Americans finally evaluate Air Vice Marshal Nguyen Cao Ky, they will be passing judgment on the entire South Vietnamese, a people of high courage and low sentiment, flamboyance, cunning, and cruelty.

The young Vietnamese, who have been buoyed by Ky's appointment, believe that he may lead their country to great heights of dedication and sacrifice. But even they question whether he will be given the time.

The talk this weekend, seven days after Ky was installed as Premier, concerns plots to unseat him. At a press conference last Thursday, the Premier's new Cabinet alarmed everyone in the hall, French, Vietnamese and American, by threatening to close the French Embassy immediately, all local newspapers on July 1 and every Saigon bar at 10 P.M.

Almost immediately Ky began to edge away from the more unpopular measures. That, say his opponents, is characteristic of him: act now, retract later.

But he is also proud and stubborn, two qualities that helped to undo Premier Tran Van Huong last January, and no one knows how much Ky will permit himself to compromise.

On his first and most arresting

policy statement, the Vietcong may have already forced him to retract. Ky had promised death for terrorists and profiteers.

He had begun by ordering the execution last Tuesday of a man charged with attempting to blow up an American military hotel.

The macabre public execution in the main market was held. Two

days passed, and then the Vietcong held their own execution. They killed an American army adviser somewhere in the forests of South Vietnam. They vowed, if Ky shot more of their men, to shoot more American prisoners.

In another defiant gesture the Vietcong blew up a riverboat that serves as a floating restaurant a

few blocks from the center of Saigon, killing at least 31 persons, nine of them Americans.

The U. S. mission had succeeded in dissuading the Quat government from executing the youth implicated in the embassy bombing last March. American officials were not willing to gamble with the life of Gustav Hertz, the U. S. aid official whom the Vietcong hold and threaten to kill in exchange.


Now it seems likely that the U. S. Government will oppose all future executions of Vietcong in Saigon in order to spare the lives of the thirteen or more American prisoners of war. That opposition will be private and might be ignored. Ky has spent much of his first week ignoring American opposition.

He and his cabinet passed over American objections to South Vietnam breaking diplomatic relations with France. And the threat of suspension of the newspapers came as an unpleasant surprise to the American embassy.

Yet, as with so much of what Ky had pledged to accomplish, the U.S. Government finds itself in sympathy. There are too many shoddy newspapers to permit any of them to improve and flourish. Profiteering has driven up the price of rice, sugar and other staples. A good scare, stopping well short of shooting them, would not hurt the exploiters, in the American view.

Official Americans have also been disturbed by the contrast Ky has seen and deplored between the high living in Saigon and the misery of poverty, disease and war in the villages.

Hardly anyone, however, expected Ky to be the man to impose drab frugality on the capital. Next September 8, Ky will be 33 years old, an occasion sure to set



Associated Press

TERRORIST EXECUTED IN SAIGON: An officer of a Government firing squad preparing to deliver the coup de grace last week to a Vietcong terrorist who was accused of having attempted to blow up a United States officers' billet located near Saigon.

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off a round of coarse jokes, for, in Vietnamese slang, to say a man is 35 (ba muoi lam) is to call him a lascivious sport, a playboy.

For years that reputation has plagued Ky. After his birth in Son Tay Province in North Vietnam, Ky's conservative and respected parents raised him and two elder sisters in Mandarin gentility in Hue. But by the time he got to secondary school Ky already had the reputation of being a "cow-boy", another Vietnamese epithet and one made more intelligible in English when the word "drug-store" precedes it.

After graduation from the Nam Dinh reserve officers' school in 1951, Ky took a series of courses for the next three years at aviation schools in France and North Africa. In 1950, he enrolled in the United States in courses dealing with air command and staff practices.

Divorce and Remarriage

Along the line, he married a French woman and fathered four sons and a daughter. As a Buddhist, he divorced her without difficulty to marry last year a beautiful stewardess from Air Vietnam.

His technique in courtships has been notorious. At a party Ky stands to recite a poem that he has written. His voice is sad, low, melodious. His eyes fill with tears. He dedicates the reading to a lovely woman in the room. "Ba muoi lam," his elders say indulgently.

But they are not so indulgent about his political ambitions as about his ardor. Vietnam is still a land where age and experience are venerated, and Ky boasts neither. Nor does he pretend that he is well qualified for his new post.

In almost each meeting of the

last two weeks, he has spoken candidly of his inexperience and of the help he will need from all sides. Some American officials, still smarting from their slights at the hands of Lieut. Gen. Nguyen Khanh, find Ky's admission engaging.

They hope that he will follow the advice of his cabinet, a group considered unusually well-equipped for the chores ahead. The finance and agricultural side of the cabinet has the American mission already enthusiastic. "Very able men," "best team yet," are typical appraisals.

The mission also counts on Ky's listening to the counsels of Maj. Gen. Nguyen Van Thieu, the head of the ten-man military group that supervises the country. Thieu, like Maj. Gen. Duong Van ("big") Minh, has good nature etched on his face. But unlike the sluggish Minh, he is also considered industrious and alert.

There is a theory making the rounds with the American mission that his military colleagues named Ky as Premier to get rid of him. First they would force him to give up his position as head of the Vietnamese Air Force, a post he used in September and February to help break up attempted coups d'état. Then they will let the natural Vietnamese mortality rate among Vietnamese premiers claim another victim. The plot seems to be only another example of occidental deviousness. Ky's military associates appear as hopeful as he for a period of political stability.

As the first week has shown, stability, even if achieved, will not mean calm. After four months of prodding the cautious Doctor Phan Huy Quat to make decisions, the Americans now worry about Ky's rashness, on the military as well as the domestic front.

The manpower problem is a good example of the American dilemma. The U. S. mission for years has encouraged the different Saigon governments to levy the draft more fairly, boost the country's armed reserves and crack down on draft dodgers.

Now Ky is prepared to do all of those things, but in so precipitous a way that the Americans worry that he will strip Saigon's industries of their limited supply of technicians.

Relations With Taylor

Ky has also been impatient for more and bigger raids against North Vietnam. Here he comes up against Ambassador Maxwell Taylor, who has a very precise idea of the tempo and targets within the bombing strategy.

So far the Ambassador's relations with Ky have been correct if not cordial. Ky was among the young officers that Taylor dressed down during the crisis in the last days of the Huong government. None of those men have forgotten that night.

When the journalists stood up to him on Thursday, he begged them to recognize his pure heart and good intentions. Besides, he reminded them, the decision to suspend the newspapers was made by the entire military council, not by him alone.

People in Saigon are past betting on the longevity of Premiers. Perhaps Ky can hang on, but there is no reason to expect him to.

The new Premier once told friends that he would like to do something spectacular in his youth. Then when retirement came, he would seek a quiet house, a garden, good books, music. He may find before the year is out that he has gratified both wishes.

The Importance of Being Bundy

BY MAX FRANKEL

BY and large in American foreign politics, the bigger the issue to be decided, the smaller the number of men deciding it. The issues, not the men, impose this rule. The need for privacy almost always overrides the obligations of democracy.

Thus it is that only a President of the United States and a handful of advisers can make the choice of this or that weapon for production next decade and the selection of this or that target for attack in Vietnam next week. And in the process, step by step, they alone make sweeping judgments and commitments and risk assessments and consequences, deciding, for instance, whether we can or wish to coexist with the Soviet Union or to resist the power of Communist China, and how—things about which millions of us have an opinion but virtually no say.

Probably, it has always been that way. But technology has accelerated history to a point where the process and the few engaged in it quite literally determine the nature of war and the chances of peace. At the moment, the pivot man among those few is the present manager of the process, is a guy named Mac in the White House basement.

Mac—that is, McGeorge Bundy of the Boston Bundys and Putnams, erstwhile Republican and former dean of the Faculty of Arts and Sciences at Harvard University—has labored in his custom-paneled basement for more

MAX FRANKEL is The Times diplomatic correspondent in Washington.

than four years and, without any political mandate, or constitutional authority, but simply by being what he is and where he is, has become one of the most influential custodians of the foreign policies of the United States, one of the very few Americans whose daily judgments directly affect the political history of the world.

But for the writers of that history who like their characters neat and clear, Mac will also be one of the most perplexing. He is one of the most accessible and articulate men in this or any other Administration, but also in the formal ways of government one of the least visible and accountable. He is both policy maker and policy tender; indeed, he symbolizes the fusion of the two. He is a forceful Administration leader and a deferential Presidential follower. And, in the current cliché, he is both hawk and dove.

HE is to start at the simplest level, the conveyor and interpreter of the Presidential will in dozens of daily foreign-affairs transactions. He monitors much and composes some of the flow of important messages and pronouncements to friend and foe abroad and to the public at home. He mediates the conflicts of the personalities and departments that deal with world affairs, directs their many streams of information and analysis and keeps a wary watch on policy plans and operations. When he says, even to a member of the Cabinet, "The President would like . . . it might as well be Lyndon Johnson saying: 'I want . . .'" But he is also the compiler and

conveyor of the thoughts and ideas of others for the President's consideration. He gathers for him the suggestions and the questions, the warnings, challenges and complaints from home and abroad, deciding how and when the President wants or ought to be informed about each.

In all, then, Bundy has come to regulate both the ingredients and the expressions of decision at the one place in Washington where the diplomatic, military, economic, scientific, psychological and intelligence aspects of foreign affairs run, or ought to run, together.

There is never any certain knowledge of whose counsel ultimately tips a crucial Presidential decision, but the impression in Washington is that Bundy as much as anyone, helped to conceive and promote the program of restrained attacks upon North Vietnam as a way of preventing the collapse of South Vietnam; that Bundy, perhaps more than anyone else, persuaded the President not to rush and tussle about de Gaulle and not to run the so-called Multilateral Nuclear Force down the throats of unwilling allies; that Bundy, working brilliantly among many, helped to shape the triumphant strategy of the Cuban missile crisis, and, confused along with many, helped to compromise purposes and tactics in the failure at the Bay of Pigs.

There is, in any case, no doubt in Washington that in the narrowest circle of advisers around both John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson, Bundy has had, despite the clumsy and ceremonially inferior title of Special

Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, a standing almost equal to that of Secretary of State Dean Rusk and Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara.

In fact, there are many who have wondered whether some of the functions of the Secretary of State were not being ceded to the man in the White House basement, so much so that he was even asked once: "Mac, if you were Secretary of State, what would you do about a Bundy in the White House?"

"No problem," he is said to have replied in a flash. "There is only one Bundy."

It was a remark that might be misread against him, but it is being retold here by his admirers as an example of the wit and skill that serve him, even in the face of impertinence.

THE fact is that Bundy is acutely aware of the prerogatives of Secretaries Rusk and McNamara, of his joint and triangular service with them in counseling the President and of their individual, separate access to the President. It is a relationship that has met the test of many crises and the demands of two Presidents.

But it is not by title or decree that Bundy ranks among them. It is because he has inspired on all sides and levels of government either warm appreciation or grudging respect for his presence and performance.

He is a man of sharp—often acid—brilliance, lean and trim of body and mind and almost collegiate at 46, agile, combative and confident, on the tennis court and in intellectual volley.

UNDER TWO PRESIDENTS

—Alone among members of the Kennedy inner-inner circle, McGeorge Bundy remains—as a member of the Johnson inner-inner circle. His title of Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs hardly suggests his central role as the man who furnishes information and ideas to the President and transmits decisions on all aspects of foreign policy. Right, he confers with Mr. Johnson on the White House lawn. Left, he sits in on one of John F. Kennedy's budget sessions in 1961. Far left, on an inspection tour of Vietnam ("he as much as anyone helped to conceive the program of restrained attacks upon North Vietnam"), Bundy is met by Gen. William Westmoreland. Ambassador Maxwell D. Taylor is in rear.

He eats, drinks, dances, plays and, above all, speaks briskly; some think tartly.

He can at once penetrate and dispose of a very important foreigner by giving him credit for possessing a "very tactical sense of the truth." Or, when asked about another, he can dip into his undergraduate mathematical training to point out that while there are no "independent variables" in international life, there always are "unpredictable" ones.

Bundy loves thus to toy with words and meanings, but rarely do they diminish his purpose. In his 12 hours at work each day and in the few hours that remain to nurture friendships and to devour works of biography and history, or art and mathematics, he is, by his own testimony, "genuinely in a hurry." And, in what was almost certainly a moment of self-revelation, he once commended to an audience the psychological thesis that man's "real motivating force" was not the Puritan revolution and not the profit motive but "the simple, natural, almost unexamined human desire to do something really well."

Excellence, speed and clarity are the things he values in himself and others, or, as he put it in a book defending the career of former Secretary of State Dean Acheson, an old family friend, virtue lies in being, on the big issues, "at once right, energetic and skillful."

AROUND Washington, the Bundy pursuit of excellence has led some to believe that he simply cannot suffer fools and that (Continued on Page 94)

The Importance of Being Bundy

(Continued from Page 33)

only with effort does he tolerate the timid. The Bundy speed has given him a reputation for quick and sometimes hasty judgment. The zeal for clarity has made him a convincing advocate even of policies with which he disagrees and the man who usually provides the most compelling summaries of points of view, others' as well as his own.

"At any meeting, Mac is the one who invariably cuts through to the heart of an argument or who cuts off the frayed edges of discussion and tells us what seems to have been decided and what remains to be settled," reports one official.

"Don't forget Mac's gift with a memo," a colleague adds. "He writes just as fast as he speaks and just as skillfully. And in this town, whoever gets it down on paper first and well is way ahead of the game."

At the State Department, where Bundy touches probably the greatest number of sensibilities, he is given at least cool respect and, more often, glowing tribute. "Just think," one prominent official says, "whenever you need the White House, there's Mac. You can put anything to him and get a confident reply. Sure he's sharp; at times even nasty. If he thinks you're off base. But often, suddenly, halfway through the conversation, he'll turn and tell you: 'You're right.' The important thing is that he's there and that he listens."

"It's logical that some people should dislike him," says another. "He blocks the path to the Presidency or gets the other fellow's view into the White House as well as yours. He has to adjudicate and break some awfully tough nuts."

AT his "little State Department," among the dozen or so men who work directly for Bundy, respect has long ago yielded to devotion. His aides welcome his being "quick on the trigger" not only because he often understands more quickly than they what they are really telling him but also because they know from experience that when they disagree they are free to hammer away at him, two and three times in a single day if they wish, and encounter only appreciation for the effort—and sometimes even a change of mind.

"Just because he is so confident," a staff aide remarks, "he is never petty, never denies what he said previously, never fears persuasion."

"An idea is judged by him as an idea," another adds, "and not by the age or credentials of its author."

Paradoxically, Bundy's interest in ideas and his obliga-

tion to keep conflicting ideas and choices before the President make it difficult for outsiders to know precisely which ones he has himself embraced and championed from time to time.

Thus, it would be misrepresenting Bundy's influence as well as his importance simply to record that he has stood at times for the firmest confrontation against Communists in Moscow, Havana, Peking and Hanoi, and at other times for self-interested accommodation with them through the test-ban treaty, the wheat sales to Russia and the Laos settlement in Asia. He has championed confrontation and accommodation with equal vigor.

But his real interest is in the



AT WORK—McGeorge Bundy in

processes of decision, which he approaches with the conviction that "where feelings become strong and differences of opinion become evident, there is some truth on every side and also some danger of error."

"What really bends the processes of government," he said after the Cuban missile crisis, "is continuous, sustained and intense effort, generally uncertain at the beginning of what its exact final outcome will be, always responsive to the situation as it is, and continuously aware of the need to be on top of that situation, and not of some abstract plan of what it ought to be, or was when one once knew it, or would be if only the people in Washington had more sense."

Bundy thinks of himself as working in the command post of a battlefield whereon is fought "the daily struggle of judgment and decision, the

contest of choice." At the moment of final choice, he believes, "there is no substitute for the single mind and will of the President" and the job of others, notably his own, is to lend the channels of information.


"This is a form of translation," he has said, "and all translation is an art."

IF there is a recognizable style in the Bundy translation and portrayal of a problem it comes from his preoccupation with the ever-present tension between power and peace, an outlook that may be traceable to his own development in prestigious as well as privileged surroundings, always concerned with the affairs of the world; to his father, Harvey Hollister Bundy, who served with Henry L. Stimson, a leader of soldiers and states-

"Nothing is more dangerous to the peace than weakness in the ultimate deterrent strength of the United States," and: "As important as having strength is being known to have it."

The effective use of strength, Bundy believes, also requires restraint, which in turn rests on a decent respect for the opinions of mankind. If any generalization of his views is valid, it is that these three elements of international conduct ought always to be observed, roughly, in that order.

It also seems fair to suggest that opportunity, more than ideology, colors the Bundy view of a problem. In a characteristically subtle but revealing passage of that essay on the Presidency, he probably yielded the most that he ever yields to ideology by saying that American strength was trained "not on the innate



his "little State Department" in the White House basement.

men, in the Departments of State and War; to his own collaboration with Stimson in a memoir, "On Active Service in Peace and War," which he has described as a landmark in his life, and to the family relationship with Dean Acheson, whose daughter is now the wife of William P. Bundy, an elder brother and the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs.

"Very near the heart of all foreign affairs," Mac Bundy wrote in his book on Acheson, "is the relationship between policy and military power." Since coming to Washington, he has not changed his view.

"We should never separate the idea of peace from this requirement of vigilance in defense" is the way he put it in

wickedness of Communism but on its evil effects."

That essay was remarkable also in that it tried to explain why McGeorge Bundy, alone among the intimate associates of John Kennedy, had so readily and successfully transferred his allegiance to Lyndon Johnson.

FOR years, Bundy's success and value in Washington had been ascribed almost exclusively to his peculiar compatibility with the late President. Only two years younger than John Kennedy, Bundy had followed him through the Dexter School in Brookline, Mass., and then gone on a separate but not essentially different course through Groton and Yale. Bundy's own political ambi-

OTHER BUNDY —

McGeorge's elder brother, William P., is Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs. At far left above, he attends a conference of Secretary Rusk with Premier Holyoake of New Zealand, left, and Foreign Minister Hasluck of Australia. In rear is Admiral Ulysses Sharp, U. S. Pacific commander.



(Continued from Preceding Page) nections kept him poised for public office.

He served in World War II as an Army intelligence officer and aide to Adm. Alan G. Kirk. After the war, he worked on the Stimson memoir, as a consultant to the Marshall Plan and, in 1948, with two future Secretaries of State, John Foster Dulles and Christian Herter, as a foreign-affairs speech writer for the Republican Presidential candidate, Thomas E. Dewey. After Dewey's defeat, he joined the Harvard staff as a lecturer in government and four years later, at the age of 34, was dean of arts and sciences—in effect, the No. 2 man at the university.

From that moment on, the eastern political and academic establishment wondered what possible heights remained for Mac to conquer. Some of the liveliest speculation ran to a university presidency, perhaps at Yale. But a chance meeting at Harvard with overseer and candidate John Kennedy led first to a switch of political affiliation and eventually to the White House basement, where, in the words of one critic, Bundy found his logical occupation: Dean of the World.

Few in Washington, and fewer still in the old Kennedy circle, expected Bundy either to attempt or to bring off a transfer to the Johnson staff. He himself seemed to be experiencing a crisis of decision in the winter of 1963-64, but finally returned from a Caribbean holiday to a weekend of resolution at the LBJ Ranch and a public declaration in the essay in Foreign Affairs that "loyalty to President Kennedy and loyalty to President Johnson are not merely naturally compatible, but logically necessary as a part of a larger loyalty to their common cause."

He felt himself needed and

really been serving the Presidency and not just a President.

How the change in President's role remains his secret, for he cannot even attempt an explanation without appearing to engage in invidious comparisons.

SUPERFICIALLY, his routine has not been altered much. He still reaches the White House between 8:15 and 8:30 each morning after dropping his four boys at school, sifts through the overnight cables and briefing sheets and completes a perusal of four morning newspapers. New developments or assessments may require immediate contact with the President, by telephone or a brief visit, and the scheduling of special meetings later in the day with senior officials of several departments and agencies.

A typical day will find Bundy handling special projects—like the recruitment of a citizens' committee to examine the problems of trade with the Communist nations—and continuing crises—like the preparation of staff papers for Presidential decisions on Vietnam. He may receive a foreign ambassador with a special problem or an American ambassador home for consultations, an American or foreign newspaperman or two, members of his own staff and a stream of telephone or personal inquiries from the Departments of State and Defense, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Atomic Energy Commission, members of Congress and other Johnson aides.

Throughout the day, Bundy is kept informed of developments through the White House "situation room," a nuclear-age communications center that he established as part of his office. By crowding an ex-



self the conduit for a truly unusual flow of information to and from the White House.

Above all, he is available to the President and is uniquely placed to measure the rhythm of world events and the moods and interests of Mr. Johnson for the appropriate time and proper presentation of issues and ideas. As their relationship has developed, he has, of course, been able to dispose of a growing number of inter-departmental matters in the President's name, but it is the direction of actual Presidential power that concerns and interests him the most.

The late afternoon is normally Bundy's slowest period and often the time for a brisk walk or quick swim. Then, as the rest of government retires for dinner, he checks through the most important outgoing cables and instructions and finally heads for home between 8 and 8:30 (between 4 and 5 on Saturdays).

Invitations to cocktail parties are almost always turned down; formal government or diplomatic dinners are avoided when possible. If he goes out, Bundy wants an occasion that he can share with his wife, the former Mary Buckminster Lothrop, who used to be associate director of admissions at Radcliffe College. A lively dancing party with a likelihood of lively repartee is said to be the best inducement to lure the Bundys from their white-brick colonial house ("home," they both point out, is still in Cambridge, Mass.).

SUBSTANTIVELY, observers believe, Bundy's position has been both enhanced and contracted by the change in Presidents. In Mr. Kennedy, it is said, he was serving a man whose interest in foreign affairs was much more than professional, a man who could not get enough visits from foreigners or enough conversation about world problems with of-

ficials from all levels of government and walks of life.

In Mr. Johnson, he is thought to be serving a man whose personal tastes run to domestic affairs and politics—though never, of course, to the neglect of urgent foreign problems—a man who cannot get enough visits from politicians and who prefers to handle diplomatic and military issues in a more orderly fashion, respecting the chains of command and responsibility.

Thus Bundy's relative influence in the Kennedy years was probably diluted by competition, in and beyond the Kennedy circle, while his opportunities for arousing the Presidential interest in the less urgent issues or less prominent personalities of foreign politics were probably greater then. But the competition has diminished while his experience has grown, and Bundy has never been accused of not finding his own opportunities.

His real influence, of course, can be known only by the President and it can be gauged only in relation to that of Secretaries Rusk and McNamara. Bundy makes sure that each is informed of his separate, and sometimes conflicting, counsel to the President; his relations with them have been described as always correct—and those with McNamara as often warm.

The common assumption that Bundy might some day wish to succeed one or the other may be an additional point of delicacy in their relationship, but so far that relationship seems to have been held in shrewd balance by the master politician whom they now serve. And in the politics of power here, as in the power politics of the world, Mac Bundy probably remains "struck," as he once put it, "by the degree to which what really happens over the next few years will turn upon forces and decisions, purposes and attitudes which are not subject to our control."

Marines Lifted From Base

SAIGON, May 3 (Reuters)—Two hundred United States marines were lifted by helicopter into an area several miles southwest of the base at Danang, which is 375 miles northeast of Saigon.

They were joined by another marine company entering the area on foot on a "search-and-destroy patrol."

The marines are officially occupying "static" defensive positions around Danang, but in practice they have been extending patrols into the countryside farther and farther each week.

Meanwhile, United States Navy jets pounded North Vietnam's main railroad link with the guerrillas in the South in a raid late today.

An American spokesman said

the track was cut 90 miles south of Hanoi by 250-pound bombs dropped by two Skyhawk planes from the Seventh Fleet carrier Coral Sea.

The jets, on a route reconnaissance, also hit 11 freight cars on the track with rockets and made strafing runs with 20-mm. cannon. Six cars were severely damaged.

In three other raids in the same area by six Skyhawks operating in pairs, two military trucks and one freight car were hit by high explosive bombs.

The pilots reported most of the targets were camouflaged. One pair of pilots said that they had encountered heavy antiaircraft fire and flak, but that all the jets had returned to the carrier safely.

IL-28's Stir U. S. Concern
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, June 4—The appearance of several Soviet-built jet bombers in North Vietnam was viewed by Administration officials today as further evidence of a deepening Moscow commitment to the Vietnamese war.

The Administration refrained from any public assessment of the development, but the appearance of the planes was being studied with concern as an indicator of Soviet intentions in Southeast Asia.

Reflecting the Administration's caution, the State Department said it was not known whether the Ilyushin-28 bombers, recently seen on airfields near Hanoi, had come from the Soviet Union or from another communist country, such as China.

The common presumption, apparently supported by secret intelligence information, is that the planes were delivered by the Soviet Union as part of its program of military support for North Vietnam.

On the question of Soviet intentions, a debate has been going on within the Administration in recent weeks.

One faction has been arguing that the Soviet Union is hesitant about becoming involved in the war and has only reluctantly been furnishing a minimum of military assistance to Hanoi as a symbol of support.

The other faction contends that an important policy shift took place last fall and that the Kremlin, in the ideological competition with Communist China, apparently decided to emphasize solidarity with the Communist camp over "peaceful coexistence" with the West. To re-establish leader-

ship and influence, it is argued, the Soviet Union decided upon military support, including modern weapons.

A concern among many officials is that the Soviet Union, in supplying the arms, may in effect, have mortgaged itself to the North Vietnamese by giving them the military power to step up the conflict into a dangerous showdown between East and West.

While the Soviet intentions remained unclear, it was becoming increasingly apparent that the United States was stepping up its military commitment in South Vietnam through an expanded combat role for American troops.

The State Department declined any immediate comment on reports from Saigon quoting a senior American official as predicting that combat troops would enter the Vietnamese war this summer.

Privately, however, Administration sources were suggesting that it was only a matter of time—perhaps days or weeks—before some American troops were committed to direct combat against the Vietcong.

Initially the stated mission of the American troops was to provide defense security for the American bases. But even in this mission the marines have been involved in combat, for in their patrolling they have intentionally sought out Communist units.

What is contemplated now is a broader, more open combat role, with American forces coming to the support of Vietnamese forces overwhelmed or pinned down by the Vietcong.

State Department officials said they could offer no confirmation of reports from Seoul that South Korea was preparing to send 15,000 combat troops to Vietnam this summer.

NYT 6/30/65 p. 1

U. S. TROOPS OPEN FIRST BIG ATTACK AGAINST VIETCONG

Drive With Vietnamese Unit
in Jungle Is a Departure
From Defensive Role

SAIGON REQUEST CITED

Westmoreland Says Decision
Falls Within His Authority
—Red Mortars Strike

Special to The New York Times

SAIGON, South Vietnam, June 29—American paratroops have joined for the first time with South Vietnamese Government soldiers for a combined offensive against a Communist stronghold in the jungle.

The operation, the most ambitious undertaken so far by United States troops in South Vietnam, began yesterday and was continuing tonight. The only fire the units have met so far came from snipers in the area known as Zone D, 20 miles northeast of Saigon.

At least one paratrooper from the United States 173d Airborne Brigade has been killed and others have been wounded by the snipers and by land mines.

News Reports Withheld

News correspondents in Saigon were asked last Sunday, on the order of Gen. William C. Westmoreland, the American commander in Vietnam, to withhold reports of the action until tonight, after all the troops had entered the jungle area.

The official United States military statement on the offensive noted that General Westmoreland had sent the paratroops away from defensive positions at their Bienhoa base "under the authority previously granted him" and "at the request of the Government of Vietnam."

[Communist mortars pounded the attack force in Zone D, killing an American serviceman and inflicting other casualties, according to The Associated Press. In the Chulai area, south of Danang, four marines were killed and four wounded in a clash with Vietcong guerrillas, the press agency said. Page 2.]

Zone D, a jagged patch running from southwest to north east, is about 18 miles wide and 36 miles long.

Resistance Is Foreseen

Zone D has been one of the largest Communist bases in South Vietnam since the time of the French colonial war in Indochina, which ended in 1954. Parts of the deep jungle have not been entered by Government forces for 20 years.

Despite a reluctance of the Vietcong so far to defend rice and supply caches in the zone, American commanders have voiced a belief that the Communists may fight back later in the offensive.

By that time, the guerrillas will have a clearer idea of the number of troops and the amount of firepower arrayed against them.

The joint commanders for the operation are Brig. Gen. Ellis W. Williamson, commander of the 173d Airborne Brigade, and Brig. Gen. Du Quoc Dong, commander of Vietnamese airborne troops.

Because American and Vietnamese forces are operating at

Continued on Page 2, Column 5

G.I.'S ON OFFENSIVE AGAINST VIETCONG

Continued From Page 1, Col. 8

different points within the forest, the commanders are conferring but maintaining full control over their own men.

American airpower was an essential part of the joint attack. More than 120 helicopters were used to ferry men into the jungle.

Korea Readyng Troops

Special to The New York Times

SEOUL, South Korea, June 4

—A high official of the Defense Ministry said today that preparations were under way, despite official denials, to send 15,000 South Korean combat troops to South Vietnam this summer.

The official, who declined to be identified, said a small advance group would leave for Saigon before the end of June.

The Cabinet was reported to have approved the advance party at a secret session Thursday. It also approved sending 260 security men to reinforce a 2,000-man South Korean engineer contingent operating near Saigon.

The South Vietnamese chargé d'affaires, Ngo Ton Dat, conferred with Foreign Minister Lee Tong Won this morning and said afterward that he had conveyed Saigon's views on the possible dispatch of additional Korean troops to Vietnam. It was disclosed last month that

this Government had asked for at least a regiment of Korean combat troops.

Premier Chung Il Kwon said at a news conference at Kwangju, during a tour of the provinces, that "the Government would carefully consider dispatching additional troops if and when it received a formal request." He added that such a request was expected from Saigon "before too long."

The assignment of a division to Vietnam would bring to about 18,000 the total strength of South Korean forces in Vietnam.

Press reports here have said that President Chung Hee Park offered a division to President Johnson in Washington last month for Vietnamese duty in place of an American division that the United States had planned to move out of South Korea. Two United States Army divisions are stationed here. Yesterday President Park confirmed that Mr. Johnson had agreed to keep the two divisions in Korea.

THE WORLD

Vietnam Pressures

In Vietnam last week the tempo of the fighting picked up, with South Vietnamese forces taking several bad beatings. At the same time, the Communist governments were talking tougher and seemed to be moving farther away from negotiations. The pressures thus increased on President Johnson to find a way out of the dilemma before the United States is plunged into a full-scale land war.

For several weeks U. S. military experts in Saigon have expected the Communist Vietcong guerrillas to step up their operations during the rainy months of the summer monsoons. That is one of the reasons American strength in South Vietnam has been expanded 50 per cent, to 46,500 men; reports are that the goal is a force exceeding 100,000. American combat troops are being sent farther and farther into the field in pursuit of the Vietcong.

In the face of the American build-up, the Vietcong last week struck in a series of sharp attacks that could be the prelude to a major offensive in central or northern South Vietnam. Government losses were estimated at more than 1,000 dead. The only effective retaliation seemed to be air power—against Vietcong concentrations and North Vietnamese bridges, truck convoys, railroad depots and army barracks. One U. S. aerial strike hit an ammunition dump just 45 miles southwest of Hanoi, the North Vietnamese capital.

The Vietcong's biggest assaults came at Quangnai, south of the U. S. air base at Danang; and at Pleiku, in the central highlands,

where American installations were hit last February. Casualties in these two attacks ranged into the hundreds. The guerrillas' tactic at Pleiku and at several other central and northern points during the week was the ambush. Government survivors said hundreds of Vietcong suddenly materialized out of the jungle and pounced on military convoys. An American officer said, "The V. C. [Vietcong] are coming out of the bloody hills. We're barely holding our own."

While U. S. military experts saw no evidence that the Communists were as yet moving from guerrilla operations to frontal battles, a senior American officer in Saigon predicted that U. S. combat troops would enter fully into the fighting this summer. Technically, U. S. forces thus far have been classified as defensive and advisory. But yesterday the State Department acknowledged publicly for the first time that U. S. troops have been engaging in combat in defense of key installations.

At the same time there were reports that a South Korean division of 15,000 men may soon be sent to help the South Vietnamese. A 2,000-man South Korean engineer contingent already is operating near Saigon.

The chances for negotiating a settlement, or even a cease-fire, seemed more remote than ever. Hanoi—which the Johnson Administration contends is directing the Vietcong campaign—still showed no positive reaction to President Johnson's "unconditional discussions" offer. And Moscow and Peking appeared to be stiffening their stands against U. S. policy in Vietnam.

Last week Britain—a co-chairman with Russia of the 1954 Geneva conference on Indochina—said Moscow seems no longer interested in reconvening the conference or calling a conference on Cambodia's neutrality, which many thought could be a "backdoor" approach to Vietnam talks. In Washington, Pentagon officials said a "small number" of Soviet jet bombers of an old type had been spotted near Hanoi. The presence of the aircraft—along with two missile sites detected earlier—was regarded in Washington as at least partial fulfillment of the Soviet commitment to assist the North Vietnamese.

As for Communist China, Peking last week issued its sharpest warning yet against the U. S. course in Vietnam. An official statement said that U. S. military activities had "threatened China's security in an increasingly serious manner," and thus the Chinese people "are all the more entitled to take every additional measure necessary."

The Communist tough talk raised anew the question: Will China or Russia, or perhaps North Vietnam, intervene openly with ground forces?

ton believed that all three Communist governments—despite threats to intervene—are reluctant to commit their own armies to the conflict. For one thing, the Communists are said to feel the Vietcong are winning the war and can achieve a victory—at least at the current level of U. S. counter-action. For another, Hanoi and Peking would be highly vulnerable to U. S. aerial retaliation in the event they launched an attack on South Vietnam. As for the Russians, they are known to be wary of any direct involvement, particularly at this time when they are confronted with domestic economic problems.

But U. S. officials expected continued infiltration into South Vietnam by regular North Vietnamese Army units to help the Vietcong with a monsoon offensive now expected later this month or next month.

This prospect brought more pressure on President Johnson last week to find a means for settling the conflict. Twenty-eight Democratic Congressmen, contending that there should be more public debate, requested hearings in the House on the Administration's Vietnam policy.

President Johnson himself called on Congress to appropriate \$89 million as a first installment on the proposed \$1 billion regional development plan for Southeast Asia that might some day be extended to a peaceful North Vietnam. Mr. Johnson said "this is the only way I know in which we can really win" the battle against Communism in that area.

In a speech in Chicago later in the week President Johnson issued a strong and direct appeal to the people of Russia to seek new initiatives for world peace. He said, "There is no American interest in conflict with the Soviet people anywhere."

But he added the warning that while Americans desire peace, they do not desire it so much that they will refrain from fighting if their interests are threatened.

U. S. Forces in Vietnam May Rise to 60,000 in June

By JACK LANGGUTH

Special to The New York Times

SAIGON, South Vietnam, May 23—Plans are well under way to bring the equivalent of a United States Army combat division into Vietnam next month, informed sources in the American mission said today.

The troops would be dispatched to bolster Vietnamese Government forces during the Vietcong's monsoon offensive.

If the plan is executed, the number of American troops in Vietnam would be brought to more than 60,000 from the present estimated total of 46,000.

[Vietcong guerrillas ambushed a large Government force Sunday near a Communist stronghold 150 miles southwest of Saigon, apparently inflicting heavy losses, United Press International reported. Page 10.]

New American Combat Unit

There have been reports that the United States 25th Division would be brought from its base in Hawaii. The sources said that the manpower plans were still being reviewed and that an equivalent number of combat troops might be used rather than an existing division.

Last Monday it was reported here that American commanders were preparing to send American combat troops now guarding air bases into battle.

In air actions today, Vietnamese and American pilots flew repeated missions over North Vietnam. [One F-105 jet was downed but a military spokesman said the pilot had been picked up, United Press International reported.]

This morning two United States Navy A-4 Skyhawks struck again at the Hon Mat Island radar site, 150 miles south of Hanoi in the Gulf of Tonkin. A building was razed.

Two other Navy Skyhawks,

Continued From Page 1, Col. 7

with two F-8 Crusader fighters as support, moderately damaged two trucks on Route 7, 85 miles south of Hanoi.

Twelve United States Air Force F-105 Thunderchiefs and eight South Vietnamese planes were reported to have destroyed 11 buildings in a new strike in the Vucbn barracks area 10 miles north of the demilitarized zone.

Forty-eight Thunderchiefs dropped 70 tons of bombs on the Phuqui barracks and supply area, which had also been a target on previous strikes. A United States military spokesman said 25 buildings had been destroyed and 48 damaged.

Two Skyhawks from the carrier Coral Sea damaged a new bridge on Route 116, a minor road in the central section of North Vietnam.

Twelve Thunderchiefs dropped 20,000 leaflets on each of two towns 20 miles west of Vinh. The messages were the same as those dropped last week, urging North Vietnamese soldiers to end the war in the South.

On the Hanoi radio in recent days, the Communists have been making their own kind of appeal to their enemy's troops.

In one broadcast heard here, the North Vietnamese announced that the National Liberation Front, the Vietcong political party in the South, was ready to talk with any military units of the South Vietnamese Government that wanted to. To join the front is not necessary, the broadcast said, nor would the Government units be expected to support the front's program.

In an ambush near Songbe, where the Vietcong mounted a major attack two weeks ago, the Communists killed three Americans and five South Vietnamese soldiers last night. Nineteen Vietnamese troops were missing.

The ambush, 70 miles northeast of Saigon, hit a truck convoy returning to Songbe after a military operation. South Vietnamese Government bombers and American armed helicopters struck in the area of the ambush, but Vietcong casualties were unknown.

Continued on Page 10, Column 3

Issue of Vietnam Command Re-examined as U.S. Role Widens

By JACK RAYMOND

Special to The New York Times

SAIGON, South Vietnam, June 18—The mounting American military commitment in Vietnam has placed under renewed examination here and in Washington the question of who is really in command in the war against the Vietcong and their North Vietnamese sponsors.

The South Vietnamese High Command holds the basic responsibility for the conduct of the war. United States military officials give advice and parcel out logistic and combat support when necessary.

For the time being, officials insist that no change is contemplated. However, there are reports of uneasiness among South Vietnamese generals that larger American commitments and the correspondingly growing death toll may result in demands for alteration of the setup.

According to one report that was investigated by Gen. William C. Westmoreland, the United States commander here, the South Vietnamese generals were loath to see Americans in certain types of battles that might undermine the prestige of the Saigon regime's forces.

A Delicate Subject

General Westmoreland is understood to have been satisfied by the South Vietnamese generals that American troops certainly were wanted. But the fact that he found it necessary to check their attitude reflects the delicacy of the subject of military command.

The adequacy of the United States-South Vietnamese command relationship long has been a source of concern and some debate in view of the failure to stem the Vietcong's growth and military potency. All suggestions for a joint or combined command have been rejected in the past, however. As long as the United States' commitment of manpower was relatively small, the American leaders stressed the logic of the "advisory" capacity.

"It is their war and they must win it," official spokesmen up and down the line have repeatedly insisted.

Now, however, the United States' uniformed strength in South Vietnam is due to rise from the present estimated total of 54,000 to 70,000 or 80,000 before the end of July. Included will be 16 ground combat battalions. The entire Third Marine Division and its air wing normally based on Okinawa will be in place near Danang by then.

The 173d Airborne Brigade

from Okinawa will be joined by other Army combat units in brigade and battalion strength although it is still not clear whether an entire Army division will be committed as a unit.

Nevertheless, earlier plans for deployment of combat forces in South Vietnam have been accelerated. And with Air Force units here and as far away as Guam as well as warships and carrier aircraft in the China Sea, the total American involvement of military manpower easily totals more than 100,000.

"There are enough American arms and men engaged in these counterinsurgency operations to give them the status of at least a small war and reason enough to re-examine the command setup," according to one officer who broke away from the official line privately.

Contingents from South Korea, Australia, Nationalist China, Japan, New Zealand, the Philippines, West Germany, Britain and Italy provide international flavor to the American-led support of the South Vietnamese regime and reminds many of the Korean war.

Salmon to Add Troops

The Government of South Vietnam, of course, has the largest force in the field, about 574,000 regulars and paramilitary troops. It plans to add 100,000 troops by late summer.

Although the Vietnamese are equipped with modern American arms, the United States is expected to provide the decisive military power. Moreover, the American forces here are already comparable in size and certainly in power with those of the enemy, 65,000 hardcore Vietcong regulars and 80,000 to 100,000 part-time guerrillas.

In the coming weeks it is anticipated that the United States forces will make direct contact with the enemy rather than remain limited to security patrols and to deployment as emergency reserves to bail out South Vietnamese units in trouble.

It is in this context that proposals have been made, for a joint or combined command such as the one commanded by General Maxwell D. Taylor, now Ambassador to South Vietnam, in the Korean war.

Those who resist the idea of a joint command say that the political and morale disadvantages would outweigh the relatively small military advantages. They insist it is important to keep the basic responsibilities in the hands of the South Vietnamese lest they lose confidence in the value of victory.

The fear of the reinstatement of colonialism is always in the

atmosphere when alterations in command authority are discussed," one observer pointed out.

In anticipation of increased American battle activity, tactics have been developed in which the United States and South Vietnamese officers would man joint command posts in the field. But when one American general was asked whether this on top of close liaison in Saigon did not in fact constitute a combined command, he replied "No, there's a close relationship, but you can't have a combined command on an informal basis."

This is precisely the point advocates of a formal joint command make. They call attention to the inevitable confusion of any combat situation, what professionals call the "fog of war."

They emphasize that in the recent bloody battle of Dongxoi United States forces were moved not so much to support the South Vietnamese as to protect the approaches to the American air base at Bien Hoa.

Services Debate Problem

Since late winter United States senior officers in Saigon, in the headquarters of the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific at Pearl Harbor, and in Washington have been discussing and debating a command system for the United States combat units in Vietnam. The debate has had two aspects: what type of command should be provided for United States air units operating in and around Vietnam; what type of command should be provided for ground units. Both questions have involved interservice differences.

After long discussion in the Joint Chiefs of Staff, at least a partial and temporary solution to the first of the problems has been achieved. Maj. Gen. Joseph H. Moore, commanding general of the Second Air Division in Vietnam, is being promoted to lieutenant general, and is now deputy to General William C. Westmoreland, who is commander of the U. S. Military Assistance Command in Vietnam. As deputy for air operations, General Moore will act as staff officer and adviser on air operations to General Westmoreland.

The Air Force has long been urging greater recognition of the importance of air power in Vietnam and has urged a centralized control over all planes used in the war. The change, however, represents less than the Air Force wanted. General Moore is a "coordinator" of air operations, rather than a commander of all of them. Most of the Navy and Marine aircraft

participating in the war are not under his command.

Two solutions have been proposed to the problem of the command of ground forces engaged in the war. Neither envisages a joint U. S.-South Vietnamese command. So far, this has been ruled out, because of the sensitivity of the South Vietnamese Government. Instead, United States-Vietnamese troops control is to be "coordinated." There will be no unified command.

As Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara explained it in a recent news conference, if United States and Vietnamese troops fight together, "the battlefield will be split into segments and the South Vietnamese forces will operate under their own commanders in one segment and U. S. troop under

their commanders in another segment."

This concept is completely opposed to the unity of command principle that is an inherent part of United States military doctrine. Bu officers say that with careful preparation and liaison it can be made to work.

The two solutions being considered in an effort to help this coordinated command to function are the establishment of four United States corps commanders, under General Westmoreland, to parallel the chain of command of the four South Vietnamese Corps; and the establishment of a field command for United States troops, under General Westmoreland, to direct American ground combat operations all over South Vietnam.

Americans Called Ready to Assume Main Burden of War on Vietcong

By JACK RAYMOND

Special to The New York Times

SAIGON, South Vietnam, July 11—The United States is viewed here as definitely on the road to taking over the main burden of combat in the war against the Communist guerrillas.

The South Vietnamese Government forces, wracked by a crisis in leadership, defeats in battle and sheer physical depletion after years of war, are considered, by those in a position to know, to be unequal to a decisive struggle against the strongly reinforced Vietcong.

The change from what is still ostensibly the advisory and supporting role of the United States forces to outright offensive operations on a wide scale is not expected to be announced as an assumption of responsibility for the war. Nor is the device of joint command likely to be employed.

But American troops, many more of whom are due to arrive shortly, will be sent out, the sources here say, to "meet and defeat" the main Vietcong and

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North Vietnamese Army units in South Vietnam. Conventional battles are anticipated rather than the hit-and-run ambushes and the sometimes aimless "search and destroy" patrolling of recent days.

Undercurrent of Doubt

Increased American casualties are foreseen, and there is an undercurrent of doubt in some quarters whether the United States public has been adequately prepared for such a heightened conflict.

Pending battles are expected to go beyond the scale of recent encounters in which the 173d Airborne Brigade and the Third Marine Division have fought the Vietcong.

Combat deployment will undoubtedly be the main subject when Defense Secretary Robert S. McNamara and the returning Ambassador, Henry Cabot Lodge, come here Wednesday for several days of consultations.

There is no evidence that Maxwell D. Taylor's resignation of the ambassadorship is related to policy aspects of the heightened American combat commitment, although it is known that he was less convinced than Gen. William C. Westmoreland, United States commander here, and other military men of the need for a larger combat role.

The increased commitment is already under way, with Mr. Taylor's approval and recommendation. The current build-up of supply bases along the coast in a vast network of airfields, ports and depots was ordered as support for combat operations.

Change in Command

The change in ambassadors has a direct bearing on the preparations for a larger war role. Until now the ambassador has been head of the so-called "country team" of United States officials here, and Mr. Taylor's former military relationship to General Westmoreland has served to underscore the dominance of the civilian over the military establishment.

Now, however, the military command appears to be taking on new and widened responsibilities for strategy as well as tactics. The comparison to civilian-military relationships in the field in past wars, notably that in Korea where the ambassador was definitely not the head of the country team, is being cited here.

The reasoning behind the United States assumption of combat responsibilities on the ground is based on a combination of factors, including the apparent ineffectuality of the

Government forces, the growing strength of the Vietcong and the belief that there is no other way to save the country.

With this there is confidence not only that the United States forces can beat the Vietcong but that any comparison with the French effort, which ended in defeat in 1954, is ridiculous.

Recent setbacks of the Government forces are commented on with considerable sympathy by American military authorities. They repeatedly stress the fact that even in the current monsoon season, when the advantages have rested with the Communists, they have still not succeeded in carving out and holding a significant area in the Central Highlands.

Victories in Delta Area

Meantime, Government forces have won several victories in the Delta area, and United States Army and Marine Corps units have at least checked Communist military operations supporting the monsoon offensive. On the other hand, while no major cities have fallen, several district capitals have, as have large farming areas where Government outposts have been evacuated.

Rice and other supplies have become short in the Central Highlands, where incessant rain and cloud cover have made deliveries impossible by air, even as they have become impossible by truck because the Vietcong control so many roads.

In addition, it is believed that the major monsoon assault has not yet taken place. It is expected in late July and August, and with powerful, well-trained forces.

In the last few weeks the Vietcong have several times demonstrated well-disciplined, professional military leadership in battles involving units of more than a thousand men. They have also shown that they are well equipped, particularly with the latest Chinese Communist carbines, rifles and light assault machine guns. They have demonstrated skillful employment of mortar fire and disciplined behavior under counterattack.

Actions Taken in Despair

On the Government side, along with examples of valor and good leadership by small units' commanders, there have been occasions when actions were taken in despair rather than in anticipation of victory.

The plain matter, according to informed sources here, is that the South Vietnamese leadership, at its highest echelons, is tired and confused and, at its lower echelons, is tired and despondent.

The attrition of high officers, who from time to time take over political responsibilities

and then are forced out in governmental changes, has taken its toll. The military men do not return to their duties in the field but are assigned abroad or otherwise sidetracked by their successors.

Even now, with Air Vice Marshal Nguyen Cao Ky presumably the strongman at the helm as Premier, there is widespread talk of a new coup d'état. The discipline in the ranks is tenuous because the top commanders behave "like warlords instead of responsible officers," as one close observer put it.

In this situation the Vietcong have massed a "hard core" of some 65,000 well-disciplined fighting men and usually can count on 100,000 irregulars.

The Government forces number around 500,000 men, but many of them must be assigned to static defense while the Vietcong can conduct roaming attacks against positions of their own choosing.

United States forces, with the latest Marine Corps increments, now number around 60,000, but these too have been limited so far to relatively static defense.

Troops From the North

What has given United States leaders pause is the identification of an entire North Vietnamese Army division in South Vietnam, plus intelligence reports that a second North Vietnamese division is gathering in the country—they assemble in jungle staging areas after infiltrating across the borders—and that there is a third in preparation for movement south.

The United States offensive operations against the hard-core Vietcong and the North Vietnamese regulars will begin when ports and airfields are sufficiently established—unless the Communists choose to provoke decisive battles sooner. For the time being the Vietcong have avoided contact with the Americans and have contented themselves with sabotage and harassing fire.

When United States forces do go over to the offensive, a major consideration will be the marking of battle zones and tactical coordination with South Vietnamese forces. What is foreseen is that areas of operations will be assigned to the United States forces, to which certain South Viet-

cont

U.S. COMBAT UNITS IN VIETNAM SPURT

3-Division Strength Is Seen
—Marines at 30,000

By HANSON W. BALDWIN

Marine reinforcements that have landed in South Vietnam are the advance guard of a far larger combat ground force that will ultimately total at least three United States divisions.

President Johnson prepared public opinion Friday for a sizable escalation in Vietnam when he said at a news conference that United States troop strength there would have to be increased beyond the publicly announced goal of 75,000 men. He added that the expectation was that the situation "will get worse before it gets better."

The President's statement represented the first public disclosure of decisions to increase strength steadily to at least 100,000 to 125,000.

The 8,000 Marine reinforcements, to be followed by Marine air elements, will raise to 30,000 the number of Marines in Vietnam. Nearly all of them are a part of the Third Marine Division and its air wing, formerly assigned to Okinawa, Hawaii and Japan.

The Marines in Vietnam so far are holding coastal enclaves, with ports and airfields at Danang, Phubal, Chulal and Quinhon. An airstrip built by the Marines and Navy seabees at Chulal has just become operational.

To replace the Third Marine Division units, large elements of the First Marine Division, normally stationed at Camp Pendleton, Calif., are being shifted to Hawaii and Okinawa.

Air Force Strength Extra

En route to Vietnam are large elements of the Army's First Infantry Division, normally stationed at Fort Riley, Kan., and the 101st Airborne Division, normally stationed at Fort Campbell, Ky. Sizable Army support and logistical forces for these and other Army combat troops are either already in Vietnam, on their way or scheduled for transfer.

Each division is initially sending one reinforced brigade of three infantry battalions, plus supporting artillery, engineers and other troops.

The total strength of United States combat and support troops in Vietnam will approximate 100,000 to 125,000 if the entire First and 101st Airborne Divisions are ultimately sent there, as is expected.

These Army and Marine ground units would be in addition to Air Force strength in Vietnam and Southeast Asia, which is also being increased, and in addition to the more than 30,000 United States military men now acting as advisers or in administrative and support roles in South Vietnam.

The current build-up of Uni-

ber full and part-time guerrillas by 10 to 1 or as much as 20 to 1 to insure victory.

The South Vietnamese armed forces have never had such superiority; in fact during the last year Vietcong strength has steadily increased as the Government forces' strength has decreased. A year ago, the South Vietnamese regular and paramilitary forces outnumbered the full-time Communist military units and the part-time auxiliaries by about 5 to 1.

Estimates Revised

Today, the ratio has dropped to less than 4 to 1. In part, the increase in Vietcong strength is due to "paper calculations"—a more realistic interpretation, Washington experts believe, of available intelligence data. And in part it is due to a heavy infiltration from the North, much of it before the monsoon season and before the United States bombing of North Vietnamese supply routes to slow down the reinforcements.

Hard-core Vietcong strength is now estimated at 65,000 full-time, well-trained regulars armed plentifully with Chinese-manufactured Soviet-model small arms and supporting weapons.

At least all or the better part of two regular North Vietnamese Army divisions, the 325th and the 304th, are now known to be in South Vietnam, and a third is believed to be across the border in Laos.

In addition to the regulars there are at least 100,000 Vietcong troops in South Vietnam, organized as irregulars in paramilitary units, and assigned permanently to specific regions, districts or villages.

The South Vietnamese regular and paramilitary forces now number somewhere between 574,000 and 600,000 men. A program to increase this number by about 100,000 men—40 battalions, plus other units—has been started, but is not expected to yield any major results until after the end of the monsoon in mid-October, and probably not until the end of the year.

Troop Build-up Handicapped

The expansion program, which has been taking about 10,000 men a month into the armed forces, has been handicapped by many factors, among them the weaknesses of successive South Vietnamese Governments, difficulties in enforcing South Vietnam's conscription laws, continued high rates of desertion or absences without leave, a lack of sufficient numbers of well-trained officers and noncoms to provide adequate training for the new inductees, and, especially in recent months, high combat losses.

The United States ground combat forces now in or en route to Vietnam were originally envisaged as compensation for the increased Vietcong strength relative to the South Vietnamese. These forces would act, officers explained, as a stabilizing or equalizing force during the monsoon season and would assume many of the duties of Vietnamese troops.

thought, and demonstrate to Hanoi that the Communists could not win.

However, it is now clear, officers believe, that the situation so far has not worked out as envisaged.

The Vietcong have not won any one tremendous victory; they have not achieved a second Dienbienphu. But since the monsoon season started in late May they have overrun a considerable number of Vietnamese towns and posts, including several district capitals, and in numerous engagements they have inflicted heavy losses on the South Vietnamese.

Moreover, their control over much of the countryside and of nearly all of the roads and railroads, though sporadic in some areas, has been considerably extended. The Vietnamese still hold the main towns but the Vietcong rule the countryside.

In addition, the Vietcong appear to have transferred the bulk of their regular hard-core units out of the Mekong Delta region, where ground mobility is difficult during the rains, to the Central Highlands and to the north, perhaps in a renewed attempt to cut the country in two or to seize and destroy a key supply base or airfield.

Quick Shift of Marines

The situation appeared so threatening that a Marine reserve battalion embarked on amphibious shipping of the Seventh Fleet was hastily landed a week ago at Quinhon to provide a perimeter defense until other Marine or Army troops from the United States could reach there.

Some observers believe that the situation has deteriorated more rapidly than had been foreseen and that the strategy of stabilization or equalization, of gradual and very slow escalation, must soon be succeeded by far larger and more rapid commitment of United States forces. The figures mentioned in Washington range between 150,000 and 500,000 United States ground troops.

United States attempts to stabilize the ground fighting in South Vietnam are being accompanied by intensified air attacks and strengthened sea patrols. The air attacks on North Vietnam have been gradually broadened to include targets closer to the Hanoi-Haiphong complex and to the Chinese Communist border.

For the first time, a Navy flag officer, Rear Admiral N. G. Ward, has been assigned to Saigon, as deputy to Gen. William C. Westmoreland, commander of the United States Military Assistance Command.

Admiral Ward's principal task is to shut off the infiltration of men and equipment by sea to South Vietnam.

United States officers believe the combined Navy-Air Force efforts—the bombings of supply routes and communications junctions in North Vietnam and Laos and the strengthened sea patrols—are delaying Communist supplies and reinforcements, though not stopping them. They remark

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namese units will be attached, but with Americans as the principal commanders.

Joint Field Commands

In regions where both forces have adjoining sectors, joint field commands will be established, but no over-all joint command is contemplated.

The obstacles to establishing such a command are chiefly political. It is feared not only that the Saigon Government would lose face but that a total alienation could occur between the United States and South Vietnamese officials. It is no secret that from time to time relations have been strained, to say the least, and that the only thing preventing a falling out has been the mutual interest in pursuing the war.

Some South Vietnamese generals would be glad to see the United States take over basic military responsibilities and would be glad to serve under General Westmoreland.

For reasons that are endorsed by both United States and South Vietnamese political authorities, the United States will be "drawn into" the front line:

of the struggle with the Communist military forces but will not charge into it by proclamation.

As United States forces clash with the main bodies of the Communist troops, the South Vietnamese will be given the task of pacifying the country—that is, routing out guerrillas, re-establishing governmental authority in villages and towns, and providing security in remote areas.

To suggestions that the United States military forces are heading into the jaws of the Communist trap that bit off French colonialism here in 1954, most United States military sources react with confident derision.

They say that the French did not have the firepower on the ground and in the air that the Americans have. They also emphasize the fact that the French did not have the battlefield mobility that the helicopter and other planes provide.

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7-18-65

U.S. Command in Saigon Backs Increase in Troops

By JACK RAYMOND

Special to The New York Times

SAIGON, South Vietnam, July 17.—The United States Military Assistance Command in South Vietnam recommended today an increase in American combat forces fighting the Communist insurgency in this country. The South Vietnamese Government made a similar request yesterday.

A spokesman for the command, Barry Zorthian, the United States Embassy public affairs officer, disclosed the recommendation of the American military groups on the second day of a survey of the military situation here by Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara.

While the officials were meeting, a squadron of United States B-52 heavy bombers from Guam blasted a suspected Vietcong base in the Central Highlands. It was the first use of the big jet bombers to support a ground operation.

Backs Prevailing Belief

Mr. McNamara, Gen. Earle G. Wheeler, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Ambassador-designate Henry Cabot Lodge and other high Washington civilian and military officials heard briefings all day by General William C. Westmoreland, the United States commander in Vietnam, and his staff.

The disclosure of the recommendations at a top-secret military session was as unusual as yesterday's disclosure of the South Vietnamese Government's recommendation in advance of President Johnson's decision.

It supported, however, the prevailing belief that a large increase in American combat power is required to cope with

the growing effectiveness of the Vietcong and growing reinforcements by North Vietnamese regular army units.

Mr. Zorthian, with Arthur Sylvester, Assistant Secretary of Defense, sitting beside him, said that insofar as numbers were concerned the recommendation by United States military authorities were "in the same ball park" as those made by South Vietnam's leaders yesterday.

He added that the recommendations today were put forward with a similar degree of urgency in view of the military

There are now 72,000 Americans in uniform in South Vietnam. About 53,000 are to be in the country before the end of the summer. These include Air Force units, but do not include about 20,000 men serving with the Seventh Fleet off Vietnam.

160,000 Men Sought

The South Vietnamese Government, with a total force of 230,000 regulars and almost 300,000 paramilitary troops, is trying to add 160,000 men.

Vietcong strength was put today at about a 43,000 to 47,000-men main force, an 18,000-man support force and 80,000 to 100,000 irregulars. It was not clear to what extent these figures included North Vietnamese Army regulars.

Virtually an entire North Vietnamese Army division, about 8,000 to 10,000 men, has been identified, and there are indications that elements of at least one other North Vietnamese division have infiltrated the country.

Mr. Zorthian reported that Secretary McNamara and the delegation from Washington had spent almost the entire day at meetings at Military Assistance Command headquarters. They were attended by the outgoing ambassador, Maxwell D. Taylor.

There was a short break for a picture-taking ceremony. The Secretary, his aides and the military staff sat around a huge oblong table. Mr. Zorthian reported later that the sessions were relatively informal with considerable "give and take."

Asked whether the recommendations for increases had evoked any opposition among the military officers, Mr. Zorthian, a reserve colonel in the Marine Corps, observed:

"Not in any military command I know."

Assistant Secretary Sylvester, the Pentagon's public affairs director, stressed that the "discussion did not come out of the blue."

He pointed out that Mr. McNamara had held continuous detailed exchanges with the military authorities here and that in advance of his visit he had sent a list of the questions he wanted to discuss.

Present and Future Needs

Mr. Zorthian said the recommendations by General Westmoreland and his staff were designed to meet the immediate and long-range needs of the military situation as well as the needs of the civilian population.

The briefings today dealt with force levels, troop deployment and supply problems. Mr. Zorthian reported, he denied that any discussion dealt with the possibility of setting up a joint United States-South Vietnamese command.

In reply to a question, he said the command structure of the United States military headquarters was not discussed.

The Military Assistance Command for Vietnam, known as MACV, and composed of American and South Vietnamese troops, is an outgrowth of the earlier Military Assistance Group, which dispensed military aid to South Vietnam.

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CASE NO. 9373-NMB

U.S.A.

VS. Russo

DEFENDANT'S EXHIBIT N 28

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Clerk, U.S. District Court, Central District of California

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Mr. Zorthian said in reply to another question that Mr. McNamara was pleased with the briefing and had complimented the military officials.

Today's briefing apparently wound up the formal inquiry by Mr. McNamara and his aides. But Mr. Zorthian said there would be continued informal discussion. One occasion for it was a dinner this evening at Ambassador Taylor's home to which South Vietnamese officials were invited.

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PART IV.

7/4/65

Vast Building Program Started in Vietnam

By JACK RAYMOND

Special to The New York Times

SAIGON, South Vietnam, July 3—A vast construction and supply program is under way in South Vietnam to provide logistical support for American reinforcements that are due to arrive in the coming weeks.

New airfields, new port facilities, including an entire new seaport at Camranh Bay, military barracks and hospitals are being prepared.

The cost is in the hundreds of millions. Presumably much of it is covered in recent supplemental appropriations, but the commitment appears to go beyond the \$700 million that Congress voted recently in support of President Johnson's policies.

Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara has announced that six to eight battalions are to be added to the 173d Airborne Brigade and the Third Marine Division, which now constitute the main ground combat forces in Vietnam.

The additions would bring the total United States forces in South Vietnam to about 80,000.

The facilities under construction will provide for a force of that size and more, if necessary. Forecasts are not available officially, but there is talk of a force of 250,000 Americans to be committed in the war against the Communists.

Elements of the 101st Air-

borne Division are expected. The First Infantry Division is expected to supply one or two brigades. The Big Red One, as the First Division is called, also may supply an artillery unit.

Qualified sources stress, however, that the American reinforcements are intended to cope with not merely the Vietcong but also with the regular units of the North Vietnamese Army that has been infiltrated into South Vietnam.

Red Division Identified

At least one full division of the North Vietnamese Army has been identified in South Vietnam. There is evidence that a second division also has infiltrated, presumably for a major strike against the central highlands around Pleiku and Kon-tum.

In view of the build-up by the Communists and preparations for a build-up by the United States, timed with the slowly growing forces of the South Vietnamese, many American officers are convinced that a "Korea-type" war is in the making. They ask privately whether some sort of "semi-mobilization" should not be ordered in the United States.

The military's historic inhibitions against getting involved in war on the Asian mainland seem to have disappeared. Insofar as analysts here are con-

cerned, the United States already is involved and now is making preparations for a major struggle against a Communist takeover of South Vietnam.

An interesting indicator of the Administration's determination to provide a logistics base swiftly for the increased American force is the fact that the joint contractors, Raymond International of Chicago and Morrison-Knudson of San Francisco, have been granted a "cost-plus fixed-fee" contract for a series of major projects.

Such contracts, in which the Government guarantees a certain fee over and above the costs to a contractor, have been condemned by Secretary McNamara. He has made a point of eliminating such contractual arrangements on the ground that they are wasteful.

The Secretary would substitute so-called incentive contracts, in which the Government pays a specific fee with increments or deductions depending on performance.

But in this matter of urgency, as in wartime emergencies of the past, even Mr. McNamara has resorted to a cost-plus-fixed-fee contract, despite his publicly stated antipathy to get a crucial job done swiftly.

The private contractors' work, which has been estimated at \$1.5 million a month in the past,

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Vietnam to Handle U.S. Reinforcements

is now building to the rate of \$5 million. They soon are expected to be involved in construction work valued at \$10 million despite the arrival of Army engineers and Navy Seabee construction battalions on many projects calling for the building of airfields, ports and the like.

Graves Unit Arrives

Perhaps an even greater indication of the increased United States commitment in the Vietnam war than the readiness of the Secretary of Defense to agree despite his objections to certain contractual arrangements is the arrival of an Army Graves Registration unit. It is the duty of these units to make certain of the identity of American dead, to make arrangements for proper care of their bodies and removal to graves either here or in the United States.

New port facilities are being built at Camranh Bay. Dredging and other improvements are being carried out at Quinhon to handle the increased shipping, especially to support the defenses of the Central Highlands.

One of the Army outfits due in Vietnam will be assigned to protect Quinhon and to engage in aggressive patrolling against the Vietcong with Quinhon as its base.

The build-up of forces and the

increased requirements in the steady bombing raids has resulted in the quadrupling of the consumption of ammunition and fuel oil.

Surface shipments have now mounted to 125,000 tons of material a month. Air shipments to support the war effort have reached a record 35,000 tons a month.

Imports of petroleum products have increased to 500,000 barrels a month. Each barrel contains 55 gallons. Similarly, ammunition stocks are being replenished at the rate of 15,000 to 20,000 tons a month for bombs and 25,000 tons a month for regular small-caliber firearm and artillery ammunition.

Logistics Problem Grows

The logistics problem is growing, especially since the Saigon and Danang harbors are congested. Also, many roads are cut and the weather has snarled aerial deliveries.

At Camranh Bay, where the Army has not waited for the completion of harbor facilities, new amphibious Lacs, descendants of the World War II Ducks, meet ships in deep harbor, take off supplies and carry them ashore.

A major problem in preparing to receive additional United States forces is to obtain land,

for airfields, depots and barracks installations.

Land is not expensive by United States standards, but it must be properly acquired through rent or purchase. One of the most unusual land-acquisition operations was conducted by an officer who recently returned to the United States. He carried huge sums of cash in a black bag and made bargains with owners and representatives on the spot for land to be used for airfields and other military installations.